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FS Capital v Adams: Disposals of Trust Assets for an Improper Purpose

The recent case of FS Capital Limited Ors v Alan Adams Ors EWCA Civ 53 sends a clear message to beneficiaries of trusts – you have recourse when trustees act improperly.

This judgment, concerning Jersey trusts, considers whether a disposal of trust assets constitutes a breach of trust due to an improper purpose.

Understanding the High Court Judgment in Adams v FS Capital

The initial case in the High Court involved a complex series of transactions related to three Jersey trusts (the 2011 Trust, the 2012 Trust, and the 2014 Trust).

These trusts were part of Employer-Financed Retirement Benefit Schemes (EFRBS), which were utilised to facilitate loan schemes. Participants in these schemes received remuneration from their employer via loans, structured to avoid income tax.

Many of these loans were later affected by the Loan Charge, a tax levied on outstanding loan balances.

FS Capital Limited (“FS Capital”) purchased loan assets from these trusts. The book value of the loan assets was initially £410 million, later reduced to £279 million. The basic consideration was paid, with deferred contingent consideration capped at £1,176,033.93, allegedly the sum owed to the Trusts’ creditors.

The Respondent Beneficiaries in the FS Capital Appeal numbered around 700 individuals.

The High Court Judgment

The key findings following the judgment of Mr Justice Edwin Johnson in the first instance are as follows.

Improper Purpose

The High Court considered the actions of the decision makers surrounding the disposal of the Loan Assets, focusing on the subjective purposes of the disposal.

The court determined that the structuring the disposal of loan assets to ensure no surplus remained for the beneficiaries was inconsistent with the proper exercise of a trustee’s power of sale.

The court emphasised that the circumstances at the time of the disposal did not justify disregarding or excluding the beneficiaries’ interests. This was in contravention of Grand View Private Trust Co Ltd v Wong UKPC 47.

The court found the trustee determined the consideration based solely on the sums owed to creditors, which improperly allowed creditor rights to take priority over those of the beneficiaries. Evidence showed an attempt to retrospectively justify this structure, aligning the consideration with debts to the Second Defendant and Hatstone Jersey.

In relation to the valuation of the Loan Assets, the judge rejected that the Defendant could apply a ‘next to zero’ valuation of the loan assets. The inclusion of a cap in the sale agreements indicated an awareness of the potential for higher value, contradicting the claim that the assets were worthless. This showed the cap was intended to limit the deferred consideration to what had been calculated as due to the Second Defendant and Hatstone Jersey and was intended to guard against the possibility of the Loan Assets turning out to have a higher value.

The court therefore determined that the disposal was made for an improper purpose.

Bona Fide Purchaser

A central aspect of the case was whether FS Capital could claim protection as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The court rejected this claim, finding that FS Capital had actual notice of the breach of trust and specifically Mr Reid and Mr Emblin (who collaborated with Mr O’Shea of the Second Defendant in designing the disposal) were aware of key facts.

Void or Voidable

Significantly, the High Court declared the disposal void in equity. This means the disposal was deemed invalid from its start. The High Court considered the Court of Appeal case of Cloutte v Storey in relation to this point.

Liability for Breach of Trust

The Second Defendant was found to have committed a breach of trust by reason of the fact the disposal was made for an improper purpose (Paragraph 401)

The Court of Appeal Judgment

The appeals in this case concern several complex issues related to Jersey trust law.

The first is whether the judge was incorrect in determining that, to be considered as having actual notice per Article 55 of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, it was enough to have actual knowledge of the facts that made the Disposal improper, rather than also knowing that those facts constituted a breach of Jersey law.

The second point, related to the first, is whether the judge was wrong to decide that FS Capital had not met its burden to prove it did not have actual notice of the Disposal and whether the judge should have used the burden of proof to make that determination.

The third issue is whether a transaction that arises from a fiduciary power being used for an improper purpose is void or voidable under Jersey law. This includes whether Jersey law is the same as English law on this point, or whether it only considers English law when making its decision.

The final issue in the FS Capital Appeal is whether the judge should have decided that the Disposal was voidable and, if so, whether he should have declined to set it aside.

The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision in FS Capital v Adams.

Fiduciary Duty

The Court of Appeal explicitly reinforced the fundamental fiduciary duty of trustees. Trustees must act solely in the best interests of the beneficiaries.

In this case, the Court of Appeal found that the power of sale was exercised to terminate the Trusts, benefit FS Capital, benefit Pinotage and Hatstone Jersey and ensure no surplus for the Beneficiaries. This indicates a conflict of interest and a failure to prioritise the beneficiaries’ interests

Further to this, the court noted that the value of the Loan Assets was unknown but could be substantial, and the purpose of the Disposal was to pay creditors without leaving any surplus for the Beneficiaries, effectively excluding them. This was deemed unjustifiable because there was a possibility of substantial value in the Loan Assets

Additionally, the Court of Appeal highlighted that the breach of trust was constituted by the Disposal and the whole purpose of putting Pinotage PTC in place as new trustee was to allow the sale of the Loan Assets, on terms which excluded the interests of the Beneficiaries, to proceed to completion. The court confirmed that a trustee cannot resign to enable a breach of trust by a successor.

The Court of Appeal highlighted the following extract from Bird Charitable Trust [2008] JRC 013, which states that the Donee:

 “…must act with good faith and sincerity, and with an entire and single view to the real purpose and object of the power and not for the purpose of accomplishing or carrying into effect any bye or sinister object (sinister in the sense of being beyond the purpose and intent of the power).”

Knowledge of the Breach

A point of contention was the extent of knowledge required for FS Capital to be fixed with actual notice of a breach of trust.

Specifically, the question was whether FS Capital needed to know that the improper purpose of the disposal constituted a breach of Jersey law. FS Capital argued that the judge erred in determining that actual knowledge of the facts constituting the impropriety of the Disposal was enough to be fixed with actual notice and contended that they needed to know the impropriety was also a breach of Jersey law.

The court equated actual notice with actual knowledge of the breach of trust or wilfully avoiding such knowledge. It was also accepted that actual knowledge arises where the defendant appreciates that the transaction in question is probably improper or there has probably been a breach of trust.

The Court of Appeal referenced Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 347 [2012] Ch 453 in relation to whether and, if so, when it is appropriate to impute the legal consequences of facts to a party who is aware of the relevant facts.  The judge noted that such knowledge is not automatically imputed.

The Court decided that FS Capital could not claim to have no knowledge of the breach of trust because Mr Emblin and Mr Reid (whose knowledge was attributed to FS Capital) collaborated in designing the Disposal that resulted in it being made for an improper purpose.

The judge emphasised that FS Capital had the burden of proving it did not have actual notice of the breach of trust. Following the hearing, the court concluded that FS Capital failed to discharge the burden of demonstrating that it had no actual notice that the Disposal was made in breach of trust.

Burden of Proof

The Court of Appeal supported the High Court’s allocation of the burden of proof.

To use the bona fide purchaser for value without notice defence, FS Capital had to prove they gave valuable consideration and had no notice of the breach of trust. The court stated it was FS Capital’s responsibility to demonstrate that they did not have actual notice of the breach of trust.

The judge found that FS Capital had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they were unaware the facts constituted a breach of trust. FS Capital did not present their evidence to suggest that they were unaware that the facts of the Disposal amounted to a breach of trust as a matter of Jersey law.

Instead, the court found that FS Capital collaborated in designing the Disposal, particularly the components that resulted in it being made for an improper purpose. The court also noted that Mr Emblin and Mr Reid knew the deferred consideration was capped despite knowing the trust assets could have substantial value. Despite looking for ways to justify the design of the Disposal, the court determined that Mr Emblin and Mr Reid were not satisfied it was legitimate to disregard the interests of the beneficiaries.

Ultimately, the judge concluded that FS Capital failed to discharge the burden of demonstrating that it had no actual notice that the Disposal was made in breach of trust. Further, there was no evidence that the Appellants sought legal advice, or if they did, that they followed it. There was also no evidence to suggest that the protagonists believed that what they were doing was in accordance with Jersey law, or that they did not believe that it was contrary to that law.

The Court of Appeal emphasised that claiming a lack of knowledge of impropriety requires pleading and proving relevant facts. FS Capital’s failure to adequately demonstrate their lack of knowledge about the breach of trust led to the rejection of their appeal.

Jersey and English Law

The Court of Appeal confirmed the close relationship between Jersey and English trust law. Jersey trust law generally follows English law unless there are conflicts with Jersey customary law or statutes.

Implications for Beneficiaries and Trustees

FS Capital v Adams has significant implications for beneficiaries and trustees of Jersey trusts, as well as those in similar jurisdictions:

Key Takeaways for Beneficiaries

  • Trustees have a fiduciary duty to act solely in your best interests.
  • Disposals of trust assets, especially those that appear to benefit parties other than the beneficiaries, will be closely scrutinised for improper purposes.
  • If trustees act improperly, you have legal recourse to challenge their actions and seek remedies, including setting aside the disposal and recovering assets.

Advice for Trustees

  • Your primary duty is to the Beneficiaries. All decisions must be made with their best interests in mind.
  • Seek Independent Advice when making significant decisions, especially those involving potential conflicts of interest.
  • Document Everything – Maintain thorough and accurate records of all decisions and the reasons behind them.

What to Do If You Suspect a Breach of Trust

If you are a beneficiary of a trust and believe that the trustees have acted improperly, it is essential to take prompt action to protect your interests.

  1. Gather Information: Collect all relevant documents relating to the trust, including the trust deed, financial statements, and communications with the trustees.
  2. Seek Legal Advice: Consult with a qualified lawyer experienced in Jersey trust law. Elysium Law has a team of experienced professionals who can assess your situation, advise you on your options and represent you.
  3. Consider a Formal Challenge: Based on the evidence, we can advise on the best course of action, whether that is:
    • Demanding an accounting from the trustees; or
    • Seeking an injunction to prevent further improper actions; or
    • Applying to the court to have the disposal set aside and the assets returned to the trust; or
    • Pursuing claims against the trustees for breach of trust.

Conclusion

The FS Capital v Adams case provides a strong precedent for beneficiaries of Jersey trusts who believe their rights have been violated. This case will also be of particular interest to similar jurisdictions that adopt similar principles.

The Court of Appeal’s decision underscores the importance of trustees’ fiduciary duties and the courts’ willingness to intervene when those duties are breached. Don’t stand by while trustees act improperly. By understanding your rights and taking proactive steps, you can fight to protect your interests and ensure the trust is managed as intended.

If you have been affected by a similar matter and are the subject of threats to call in loans, contact Elysium Law for a free, confidential consultation.

Less Tax For Landlords: Mistake and the Unintended Tax Consequences

Since November 2023, Elysium Law have been taking enquiries from current/former Less Tax for Landlords clients.

We have previously canvassed the idea of bringing an action under CPR Part 8 for equitable mistake. However, given HMRC’s prevarication, this action has not previously been open to LT4L Clients.

HMRC have now announced that the Letter of Trust which transferred the beneficial interest to the corporate partner in the LLP had Stamp Duty Land Tax liability.  

As a result, landlords that have implemented Less Tax For Landlords’ planning (including those who implemented the planning via Chris Bailey directly) are facing significant and unintended tax consequences.

This will potentially give rise to a claim in professional negligence, but the priority must be to mitigate the losses. One option available is an application to the Court to set aside the arrangements on the grounds of mistake.

We have been approached by a large number of LT4L victims to advise, together with Tax Counsel as to the prospects of bringing this claim.

Should you be the victim of unintended tax consequences, the equitable doctrine of mistake may be open to you

In Bhaur and others v Equity First Trustees (Nevis) Ltd and others [2023] EWCA Civ 53 (Bhaur) the Court of Appeal provided helpful guidance on when a court will set aside a transaction and  unwind adverse tax consequences. In summary, this was a tax avoidance scheme using the (abusive) EBT arrangements, to avoid IHT which the court refused to unwind. In this case the presentation of the trust to HMRC was dishonest and was tantamount to tax evasion.

Having lost in the High Court, the Appellants first ground of appeal was that the Judge should have allowed the transaction to be unwound in that the Appellants belief that they would incur no tax consequences was not a misprediction, but a mistake.

The first instance Judgment contains an extended analysis of the law on the setting aside of voluntary dispositions for mistake. The leading authority in the area is the decision of the Supreme Court in Pitt v Holt [2013] 2 AC 108.

In Pitt v Holt, at [103], Lord Walker adopted, the approach of Lloyd LJ in the Court of Appeal ([2011] EWCA Civ 197 at [210]-[211]), setting down three principles which would lay the groundwork for the exercise of the equitable jurisdiction to set aside a voluntary disposition, namely;

  1. A mistake, which is;
  2. Of the relevant type; and
  3. Is sufficiently serious so as to render it unjust or unconscionable on the part of the donee to retain the property given to him.

Misprediction or Mistake – the difference

Misprediction

In Pitt v Holt the Court said a misprediction relates to some possible future event, whereas a legally significant mistake normally relates to some past or present matter of fact or law.

In Dextra Bank & Trust v Bank of Jamaica[2001] UKPC 50[2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193 at [29], the court said “… to act on the basis of a prediction is to accept the risk of disappointment. If you then complain of having been mistaken you are merely asking to be relieved of a risk knowingly run …”

Mistake

This is a different consideration. The courts and lawyers generally deal with mistakes as to the consequences of a transaction.

For many years, a distinction was drawn between a mistake as to the effect of a transaction and its consequences. However, the modern approach is that providing the court is satisfied that there is a causative mistake of sufficient gravity; and as additional guidance to judges in finding and evaluating the facts of any particular case, that the test will normally be satisfied only when there is a mistake either as to the legal character or nature of a transaction, or as to some matter of fact or law which is basic to the transaction.

The gravity of the causative mistake is relevant to an assessment of injustice or unconscionability. The court said that the injustice (or unconscionability) of leaving a mistaken disposition uncorrected must be evaluated objectively, but with an “intense focus” on the facts of the case including the circumstances of the mistake and its consequences for the person who made the disposition.

An evaluation – what are the merits of the case?

The court will look at the surrounding circumstances and the (in) justice done to the person making the disposition. The doctrine of mistake applies to unintended tax consequences. In Pitt, the court rejected any suggestion that mistake could not apply to tax issues. However, the court added the following when referring to previous cases and in particular Futter v Futter where the doctrine of mistake was not raised by the (Plaintiff). Lord Walker in Pitt said;

“Had mistake been raised in Futter v Futter there would have been an issue of some importance as to whether the court should assist in extricating claimants from a tax avoidance scheme which had gone wrong. The scheme adopted by Mr Futter was by no means at the extreme of artificiality (compare for instance, that in Abacus Trust Co (Isle of Man) v NSPCC [2001] STC 1344) but it was hardly an exercise in good citizenship. In some cases of artificial tax avoidance, the court might think it right to refuse relief…”

Why you need advice on the scheme

Lawyers and students alike will recognise the maxim ‘He who seeks Equity must do Equity’, but effectively any refusal now is based on public policy consideration. An example of this can be found in the case Dukeries Healthcare Limited v Bay Trust International Limited [2021] EWHC 2086 (Ch), with Deputy Master Marsh holding that, whilst the doctrine of mistake applied, it was refused nevertheless on the grounds that the whole transaction amounted to an artificial tax avoidance scheme.

Anyone affected needs independent advice, considering the degree of risk and any artificiality of the scheme, given that unintended tax consequences are an issue. This should be advised upon by an independent law firm such as Elysium Law and will involve review of the documentation, any advice provided to the Claimant at the time and what it was that was that the Claimant hoped would be achieved.

Should you be the victim of unintended tax consequences, the equitable doctrine of mistake may be open to you.

Elysium Law have been approached by a large number of LT4L victims to advise, together with Tax Counsel as to the prospects of bringing this claim.

For further advice, or if you wish to join the group, please contact us at Elysium-law

Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil: the Court’s Power to Order ADR

The recent Court of Appeal decision in Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1416 has had a profound impact on litigators, given the Court now has the power to compel parties to engage in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).

In this article Ruby Keeler-Williams looks at the background of the matter, considers the decision and looks at the implications going forward.

Background

The case involved a property dispute between Mr Churchill, the Claimant, and Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council, the Defendant. Mr. Churchill alleged that Japanese knotweed had spread from the Council’s land onto his property, causing damage and diminishing its value. He initiated a nuisance claim against the Council.

However, the Council countered that Mr. Churchill was obligated to make use of their internal complaints procedure before pursuing litigation. They sought a stay of proceedings, aiming to enforce use of this process.

Initial Decision and Appeal

In the first instance, the judge dismissed the Council’s stay application, citing Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576, in which it was suggested that the court compelling ADR could obstruct a party’s right to access the court system. However, this decision was successfully appealed by the Council.

The Court clarified that the relevant passage from Halsey which stated that compelling ADR would impose ‘an unacceptable obstruction on their right of access to the court’ was, according to the Court of Appeal, not a ‘necessary step’ in Lord Justice Dyson’s conclusion and therefore was ‘obiter’ and not binding. This was because the issue of whether or not the court had the power to compel ADR was only raised in Halsey during oral argument.

The court went on to clarify that Dyson LJ, in Halsey, was primarily focused on providing guidance on how to assess whether a party acted unreasonably in refusing ADR in the context of a costs order, rather than definitively ruling on the court’s power to mandate ADR

Court can Direct Parties

It was subsequently decided that the Court possesses the power to order parties to engage in ADR, including issuing a stay of proceedings to facilitate such processes.

This authority stemmed from CPR Part 1 and in particular:

  • CPR 1.4(1) – which sets out the Court’s duty to “further the overriding objective by actively managing cases”
  • CPR 1.4(2)(3) – which set out that the Court’s active case management included encouraging parties to use ADR if the court considers that ‘appropriate’

The Court’s decision is in keeping with the broader objectives of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and the overriding objective to ensure cases are dealt with justly and at proportionate cost.

In encouraging ADR, the Court is achieving these aims by offering litigants a potentially faster and less expensive alternative to traditional court proceedings.

The Right to a Fair Trial

It is important to note that the Court’s power to compel ADR is not an absolute power. Any order for ADR must respect a party’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The precedents considered in coming to this decision included: Ashingdane v United Kingdom, Tolstoy Miloslavsky v United Kingdom and Momcilovic and others v Croatia.

The Court stressed that any limitation on the right to trial must:

  • Not impair the essence of the right to a fair trial, meaning the ADR process should not unfairly disadvantage or prejudice any party.
  • Pursue a legitimate aim, meaning the decision to order ADR must be driven by a valid objective, such as promoting a fair, efficient, and cost-effective resolution.
  • Be proportionate, meaning the benefits of ordering ADR, such as the potential for settlement, must outweigh any potential drawbacks, such as delays or costs.

This approach demonstrates that the Court is under a duty to exercise its authority judiciously.

Broader Implications

Despite Churchill being focussed on the Council’s internal complaints procedure, the decision has much broader implications.

The judgment suggests that courts could order stays for various forms of ADR, such as mediation, early neutral evaluation, or even informal negotiation, as long as the chosen process holds the potential to resolve the dispute.

This reflects the Courts’ growing recognition of the benefits of a move away from a rigid, adversarial approach to litigation towards a more flexible and solution-oriented system.

Practical Guidance for Litigators

Following this decision, litigators need to adopt a more strategic approach to ADR at a pre-action stage.

My recommendations are as follows:

  • Consider ADR Early – Litigators should advise their clients to explore ADR options before filing proceedings. This should include a consideration of the different ADR methods possible, including any relevant internal complaints procedures where applicable.
  • Have a robust explanation if you choose to refuse ADR – If your client chooses to refuse ADR, you must be prepared to provide the court with compelling reasons, as such decisions will be scrutinised, especially when parties are legally represented or there is a discrepancy in the parties respective resources.
  • Understand that the Court does have a discretion – The application of this decision will be fact dependant. The Court will consider factors such as the nature of the dispute, the stage of the litigation, the parties’ conduct, and the specific method of ADR proposed.

Conclusion

Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council signifies a potential turning point, as the Court of Appeal’s decision signals a clear shift toward the Court’s promoting ADR.

If you would like more information regarding ADR, have a dispute you’d like advice upon, or wish to book Richard Gray, our qualified mediator, please contact us.

Professional Indemnity Insurance in Professional Negligence Claims

Introduction

Professional indemnity insurance (PII) is a type of liability insurance held by professionals, which covers them in relation to negligent acts or omissions.

For Claimants, the existence of PII can be the difference between a successful financial recovery and a pyrrhic victory, as without PII the professional may lack the resources to personally satisfy the judgment.

In this article I will set out the importance of PII in professional negligence claims, examining how it influences the litigation process, impacts settlements, and what Claimants should be aware of when dealing with insured professionals.

What is Professional Indemnity Insurance?

Professional indemnity insurance is a type of liability insurance designed to protect professionals against claims made by their Clients for damages arising from any negligent acts, errors, or omissions. This insurance is particularly important in professions where mistakes can lead to significant financial loss for clients, such as law or accounting.

In many professions, PII is a regulatory requirement. Solicitors in England and Wales must maintain a minimum level of PII under the SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules. At the time of writing, these limits are at least £3 million where the insured firm is a relevant recognised body or a relevant licensed body, and in all other cases, at least £2 million.

Other professional bodies also impose the requirement of PII upon professionals, including accountants, financial consultants, surveyors, engineers and healthcare professionals. The reason for this is to protect the public by ensuring that professionals can cover the cost of any claim.

The Impact of PII on Professional Negligence Claims

Whether or not a professional holds PII can influence the viability of a professional negligence claim. For Claimants, PII offers financial certainty as it ensures that, even if the professional themselves are unable to meet the claim from their own resources, the insurer will step in to cover the liability. This is particularly important in high-value claims, where the potential damages could far exceed the professional’s personal assets – without PII, this would result in a pyrrhic victory for the Claimant.

Furthermore, the existence of PII often facilitates quicker and more efficient settlements. Insurers, who are commercial entities and can be keen to avoid the costs and uncertainties associated with litigation, may be more inclined to settle claims early, given they can objectively assess the events that have led to the litigation and the commercial merits of challenging the claim – provided they believe the claim is justified and falls within the terms of the policy. This can lead to a more streamlined process, sparing both parties the time, expense, and stress of a court trial.

The Role of Insurers in Litigation

Insurers often play a key role in the defence of professional negligence claims. Once a claim is made, it is typically the insurer who assumes control of the defence, appointing solicitors and experts to investigate the claim and determine the best course of action. This means that the claim is typically run by a party that was not involved in the events that have led to the action. This can significantly shape the litigation strategy, as insurers will often seek to objectively assess the merits of the claim with a view to minimising their exposure to adverse costs.

Insurers may also influence whether a case goes to trial or is settled out of court. Their decision will often be the result of assessing strength of the evidence, the potential costs of litigation, and the terms of the insurance policy. In some cases, insurers may push for settlement to avoid the unpredictability of a court judgment and the risk of adverse costs, while in others, they may choose to litigate if they believe the claim lacks merit.

The involvement of insurers can be seen in the case of Standard Life Assurance Limited v Oak Dedicated Limited and others [2008] EWHC 222 (COMM), which demonstrates the insurer’s right to control the defence and settlement of a claim. It was held that an insurer is not obliged to cover a settlement made by the insured without the insurer’s consent. This case demonstrates the importance for insured professionals to obtain insurer approval before settling, as failure to do so can lead to a denial of coverage and personal liability. Claimants should be aware of this when conducting settlement negotiations.

Disclosure of Insurance Details During Proceedings

A key strategic consideration for litigators running professional negligence claims is the disclosure of insurance details. For certain professions, there may be a duty to disclose detail. An example of this is Solicitors are required under Rule 9.2 of the SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules to provide to a Claimant or any other person with a legitimate interest: the name of their participating insurer, the policy number and the address and contact details of the insurer.

Additionally, in relation to insolvent Defendants only, it is possible to obtain information regarding a policy via the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010.

Outside of these provisions, it can be a challenge to force disclosure of information. In the case of Peel Port Shareholder Finance Company Ltd v Dornoch Limited, it was held that the court should only consider ordering disclosure of a solvent insured’s insurance details in exceptional circumstances. This can lead to difficulties in obtaining disclosure of the insurance details at a pre-action stage (such as via an application under CPR 31.16 as in this case), which creates uncertainty for the Claimant.

While there is no general obligation for a Defendant to disclose their limit of indemnity, there are situations where such disclosure may be advantageous. For example, if a Claimant knows that a Defendant is insured, it can provide reassurance that any judgment will be satisfied, potentially leading to a more aggressive approach to the litigation strategy or a higher settlement demand. In contrast, disclosure of a limit that is substantially below the value of the claim may lead to the merits of pursuing a claim being re-assessed, which could be advantageous for the Defendant/insurer.

In practice, disclosure of insurance details might be volunteered to encourage a Claimant to accept a reasonable offer, knowing that the insurer has the funds to pay the settlement and to pursue the litigation. However, there are also risks in disclosing such information, as it may lead to inflated demands. Ultimately, the approach differs between different insurance companies.

The Consequences of pursuing Uninsured Professionals

Making a claim against an underinsured or uninsured professional is one of the most significant risks for Claimants in cases of professional negligence. In the event that a professional does not have sufficient insurance, the Claimant may be successful in getting a judgement only to discover that there are insufficient or no assets to cover the award. This can be particularly damaging because it effectively renders the judgement financially meaningless.

To mitigate this risk, Claimants should conduct thorough due diligence before pursuing a claim. This involves requesting confirmation of the insurance coverage or checking with professional regulatory bodies that may hold relevant information. However, as discussed above, the insurer does not always have to disclose the limit of indemnity.

Policy Exclusions and Limitations

While PII provides protection, it is not a guarantee of coverage. PII policies often contain exclusions and limitations that can significantly affect recoverability. Common exclusions include acts of fraud, criminal behaviour, and deliberate breaches of professional codes of conduct. Additionally, some policies may exclude coverage for claims arising from certain high-risk activities or may impose sub-limits on specific types of claims.

It is vital that Claimants understand these exclusions, as they establish the extent of coverage and the likelihood of a favourable outcome. The terms of the PII policy must be thoroughly reviewed in order to identify any potential obstacles to recovery. As this can result in drawn-out legal disputes over the interpretation of policy terms, this review is particularly crucial in cases where the insurer raises exclusions as a defence against liability.

In the case of Zurich Professional Ltd v Karim [2006] EWCH 3355 (QB), the insurer Claimant obtained a declaration that the claims made under the Defendant solicitors’ professional indemnity policy arose “from dishonest or fraudulent acts or omissions committed or condoned by the insured” and accordingly they were not obliged to indemnify the insured.

Insurers’ Right of Subrogation

Subrogation is a fundamental principle that allows an insurer to step into the shoes of the insured after payment of a claim and pursue recovery from third parties who may be responsible for the loss. In professional negligence, subrogation rights can be particularly relevant when multiple professionals are involved in a matter, and one professional’s negligence contributes to the loss.

For example, if an insurer pays a claim on behalf of a negligent solicitor, they may seek to recover those funds from another party, such as a barrister who advised, as they may be liable for the same loss. Subrogation ensures that the loss falls on the party responsible for the negligence, rather than reverting to the insurer or the insured professional.

Conclusion

Professional indemnity insurance is an important consideration in any professional negligence. For professionals, PII offers protection against the financial consequences of a negligence claim, while for Claimants, it provides a source of funds to satisfy a judgment or settlement. However, the presence of PII also creates difficulty for litigators, including issues related to policy exclusions, the role of insurers in litigation, and the strategic considerations surrounding disclosure and settlement. Understanding these factors is crucial in any case.

If you are considering or are involved in a professional negligence claim, understanding the role of professional indemnity insurance is essential. Our experienced team is here to guide you through the complexities of PII and provide tailored advice for your specific case. Contact us today.

Contractors – Received a Demand from West 28th Street Limited? Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Pay Yet

Elysium Law has been approached by an insolvency practitioner who has received enquiries regarding demands made by West 28th Street for repayment of loans from various Employee Benefits Trusts (EBTs).

Elysium Law has engaged with West 28 Street on behalf of over 650 clients. The alleged debts (the Loans) were assigned from Felicitas, a specially formed company in the Isle of Man, one of whose directors was Adrian Sacco. Mr Sacco has been disqualified from being a director in England and Wales and also in the Isle of Man. We’ve linked the Insolvency Service publication which demonstrates specifically his behaviour which gave rise to the disqualification. Felicitas attempted to serve demand letters and, in some cases, Statutory Demands for Bankruptcy. Elysium Law, acting in Our Clients’ interests, resisted those demands, which were all subsequently withdrawn.

Following a Mediation and our Letter of Response, Felicitas Solutions Limited (the Isle of Man Company) was dissolved after the debts were purportedly assigned to West 28th Street Limited.

Upon being further contacted, Elysium law sent the Letter of Response to West 28th Street for them to consider – Elysium Law has received no substantial response and nor have our clients.

Our Position in relation to the Demands of West 28th Street

There is a claim in breach of trust for equitable and other relief. The Defendant purports to have purchased and/or been assigned the Trust Assets and has sought to enforce a loan as between the beneficiary who is a contractor (“Beneficiary”) and the original Trust Company (“the Loans”), this was a marketed tax avoidance scheme.

The significance of the purported assignment to Felicitas, and the current purported assignment to West 28th Street, is that they were made for an improper purpose against the interests of the Beneficiaries and with a view to enabling fees to be recovered for the transfers in favour of the Trustees and secondly, recoveries under the Loans in favour of the purported assignees. Accordingly, the assignments were detrimental to the best interests of the Beneficiaries.

They were also contrary to the terms of certain oral collateral undertakings provided by or on behalf of the employers, to the effect that the Loans would not have to be repaid and were the means by which the tax avoidance scheme could operate.

On behalf of its clients, who are Beneficiaries under the various Trusts, Elysium Law contend that any assignments or transfers were for an improper purpose and are void in equity. Any beneficial interest has remained as the property of the Beneficiaries and has not been transferred or assigned. Any purported transfer or assignment is void or otherwise liable to be set aside.

The repeated assignments were in breach of an implied term of the trust relating to the proper exercise of its powers and were unlawful because they were carried out for an improper purpose (also known as a fraud on the power).

The Constructive Trust

The position as set out in FS Capital is that no interest, or right to the Trust Assets have been transferred by the various assignments because they are void. To the extent required, the Beneficiaries will contend that any trust assets alleged to have been assigned by the various assignments are held by the Defendants by means of a Constructive Trust for the benefit of the Beneficiaries. The imposition of the constructive trust arises by operation of law and imposes upon any purported assignee or transferee, the fiduciary principles of a Trustee with regard to the preservation of Trust Assets and the protection of the interests of the Beneficiaries.

The Position

In short, we think the position is as follows:

  1. The assignments were void;
  2. The loans are not enforceable;
  3. Those beneficiaries who have already come to an arrangement must be paid their money back; and
  4. West 28th Street hold all of the assets on trust for Our Clients and all Beneficiaries under the Trust.

Elysium Law are currently acting for a group of 650 Clients who are contesting this claim.

If you wish to join the claim, or are an insolvency practitioner who have been approached by West 28th Street or a firm called Fiscus Management in relation to Your Clients, then please Contact Us.

Mistake and the Unintended Tax Consequences

Elysium Law have received enquiries from taxpayers who have received large CGT assessments from HMRC which have been raised as a result of the Trust document used by Property 118 and Cotswold Barristers.

HMRC’s position is that incorporation relief provided by Section 162 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 is not available as a result of a clause used in the purported Deed of Trust which creates a power of revocation, allowing the Trustees to vest the property in themselves absolutely and bring the trust to an end. HMRC’s position is that this future right to receive the property creates a separate contingent beneficial interest, which is not transferred to the company. As a consequence, the whole of the assets of the business are not transferred to the company and the relief is not available.

As a result, landlords that have implemented Property 118 or and Cotswold Barrister are facing significant and unintended tax consequences.

This will potentially give rise to a claim in professional negligence, but the losses must be mitigated. One option available is an application to the Court to set aside the arrangements on the grounds of mistake.

Should you be the victim of unintended tax consequences, the equitable doctrine of mistake may be open to you

In Bhaur and others v Equity First Trustees (Nevis) Ltd and others [2023] EWCA Civ 53 (Bhaur) the Court of Appeal provided helpful guidance on when a court will set aside a transaction and  unwind adverse tax consequences. In summary, this was a tax avoidance scheme using the (abusive) EBT arrangements, to avoid IHT which the court refused to unwind. In this case the presentation of the trust to HMRC was dishonest and was tantamount to tax evasion.

Having lost in the High Court, the Appellants first ground of appeal was that the Judge should have allowed the transaction to be unwound in that the Appellants belief that they would incur no tax consequences was not a misprediction, but a mistake.

The first instance Judgment contains an extended analysis of the law on the setting aside of voluntary dispositions for mistake. The leading authority in the area is the decision of the Supreme Court in Pitt v Holt [2013] 2 AC 108.

In Pitt v Holt, at [103], Lord Walker adopted, the approach of Lloyd LJ in the Court of Appeal ([2011] EWCA Civ 197 at [210]-[211]), setting down three principles which would lay the groundwork for the exercise of the equitable jurisdiction to set aside a voluntary disposition , namely;

  1. A mistake, which is;
  2. Of the relevant type; and
  3. Is sufficiently serious so as to render it unjust or unconscionable on the part of the donee to retain the property given to him.

Misprediction or Mistake – the difference

Misprediction

In Pitt v Holt the Court said a misprediction relates to some possible future event, whereas a legally significant mistake normally relates to some past or present matter of fact or law.

In Dextra Bank & Trust v Bank of Jamaica [2001] UKPC 50[2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193 at [29], the court said “… to act on the basis of a prediction is to accept the risk of disappointment. If you then complain of having been mistaken you are merely asking to be relieved of a risk knowingly run …”

Mistake

This is a different consideration. The courts and lawyers generally deal with mistakes as to the consequences of a transaction.

For many years, a distinction was drawn between a mistake as to the effect of a transaction and its consequences. However, the modern approach is that providing the court is satisfied that there is a causative mistake of sufficient gravity; and as additional guidance to judges in finding and evaluating the facts of any particular case, that the test will normally be satisfied only when there is a mistake either as to the legal character or nature of a transaction, or as to some matter of fact or law which is basic to the transaction.

The gravity of the causative mistake is relevant to an assessment of injustice or unconscionability. The court said that the injustice (or unconscionability) of leaving a mistaken disposition uncorrected must be evaluated objectively, but with an “intense focus” on the facts of the case including the circumstances of the mistake and its consequences for the person who made the disposition.

An evaluation – what are the merits of the case?

The court will look at the surrounding circumstances and the (in) justice done to the person making the disposition. The doctrine of mistake applies to unintended tax consequences. In Pitt, the court rejected any suggestion that mistake could not apply to tax issues. However, the court added the following when referring to previous cases and in particular Futter v Futter where the doctrine of mistake was not raised by the (Plaintiff). Lord Walker in Pitt said;

“Had mistake been raised in Futter v Futter there would have been an issue of some importance as to whether the court should assist in extricating claimants from a tax avoidance scheme which had gone wrong. The scheme adopted by Mr Futter was by no means at the extreme of artificiality (compare for instance, that in Abacus Trust Co (Isle of Man) v NSPCC [2001] STC 1344) but it was hardly an exercise in good citizenship. In some cases of artificial tax avoidance, the court might think it right to refuse relief…”

Why you need advice on the scheme

Lawyers and students alike will recognise the maxim ‘He who seeks Equity must do Equity’, but effectively any refusal now is based on public policy consideration. An example of this can be found in the case Dukeries Healthcare Limited v Bay Trust International Limited [2021] EWHC 2086 (Ch), with Deputy Master Marsh holding that, whilst the doctrine of mistake applied, it was refused nevertheless on the grounds that the whole transaction amounted to an artificial tax avoidance scheme.

Anyone affected needs independent advice, considering the degree of risk and any artificiality of the scheme, given that unintended tax consequences are an issue. This should be advised upon by an independent law firm such as Elysium Law and will involve review of the documentation, any advice provided to the Claimant at the time and what it was that was that the Claimant hoped would be achieved.

Should you be the victim of unintended tax consequences, the equitable doctrine of mistake may be open to you.

Elysium Law has been approached to consider bringing such a claim.

For further advice please contact us at Elysium-law

Less Tax For Landlords – The Flawed Business Property Relief Claim

We are writing this article as a result of the extensive enquiries we have received from Landlords who engaged in planning offered by Less Tax for Landlords and the Bailey Group.

HMRC’s view (and that of every other tax expert) is that the planning does not work. HMRC’s views are set out in Spotlight 63. They can be seen here.

In this article, we will look at Business Relief, explaining what it is, when it applies, what LT4L and the Bailey Group have told their clients and why their view is incorrect.

What is Business Relief

Business Relief (formerly known as Business Property Relief) reduces the value of business property for inheritance tax. It is available on the transfers of business assets during lifetime or upon death. To qualify, the business asset must usually have been owned throughout the two years before death or transfer.

There is no Business Relief if the business or company is one of ‘wholly or mainly’ in dealing in securities, stocks or shares, land or buildings or in the making or holding of investments.

A business that only generates investment income will not attract BPR, so this excludes:

  • A residential or commercial property letting business.
  • A property dealing business.
  • A serviced office business.

This means relief is not available to landlords with rental property.

The legislation is contained in Section 105(3) and (4), IHTA 1984.

In deciding whether a business consisted “wholly or mainly” of one or more of these prohibited activities, the courts will look at the business in the round, taking into account all of its activities both at the date of the transfer and over a reasonable period of time before the transfer (which may be several years), to see if one or more prohibited activities predominate – see the case of  George v IRC [2003] EWCA Civ 1763. This means that the test will be applied to the specific facts in each case. Most of the case law considering the ‘wholly or mainly’ test has looked at whether a business is mainly involved in investment activity rather than trading or service provision. 

It therefore seems incontrovertible that BPR or Business Relief is NOT available to Landlords. It defies belief that Chris Bailey, LT4L and the Bailey Group told clients that Business (Property) Relief was available and that the deceased’s estate would not be met with a significant Inheritance Tax liability upon the death of the deceased.

The (Flawed) Basis of the Advice given to the participants in this planning

We must repeat that there is not one tax professional who agrees with the assertion of the availability of Business Relief.

The following is an example of a discussion between Chris Bailey and a tax professional who questioned this aspect of the planning.

Trusted Advisor: You indicated that by structuring the property business in the particular way that you do, you create a trade which would benefit from BR, giving IHT exemption after 2 years. Business relief is not available for businesses which wholly or mainly involve the making or holding of investments. HMRC considered the holding of rental properties an investment business, which I appreciate is a business and can qualify for s.162 TCGA, but regardless of whether it qualifies for incorporation relief is specifically excluded from Business Relief under s.105(3). As such, unless the business of the LLP relates more than 50% to something other than the holding and letting of residential property, then I don’t see how it can qualify for BR, particularly when 100% of the income, management time and expenditure relates to the letting of rental properties.

Chris Bailey: The LLP holds the equity and not the properties – so it cannot be classed as an investment. The owner of the properties will not qualify for BR on the properties, but on the equity.

Trusted Advisor: I don’t understand how holding equity in a property ‘cannot be classed as an investment’. The case of M ROSS v HMRC (2017) confirmed that the exploitation of land in return for rent is still an investment business (this was an FLH (Furnished Holiday Let) case so related to a business that tax law recognises as a trade) and denied business relief. What is the business doing which is not the exploitation of land which would elevate the activity beyond that of a furnished holiday let? Caselaw in recent decades has been very clear that a business must offer significantly more than just the exploitation of a proprietary interest – what additional services do you suggest are being provided by the business, which means it’s not an investment?

Chris Bailey: Once again, unfortunately, we have had clients die during the time that they have been clients and HMRC have accepted all of our Probate calculations based on the above. The cases range from small cases (about £1m assets) to larger cases in excess of £5m assets.

Elysium Law have been approached by clients who, having submitted the claim for Business Relief as advised by Chris Bailey et al via Accountancy and Legal Solutions UK ( which is now OCG Legal and part of the Less Tax for Landlords group of companies), have now received a review of the claim.

So, does it work? – No

Here is an extract from HMRCs letter to the client (redacted to protect any identity:

“The executors returned business assets valued at REDACTED on the IHT400 reporting the IHT Account for REDACTED’s estate. The IHT400 return shows that business property relief was claimed against the full value of these assets.

I am aware that Accountancy and Legal Solutions UK have provided advice to other taxpayers with similar investment businesses in respect of Business Property Relief claims and that those claims have been determined invalid (Our emphasis). Therefore, I am conducting a review to confirm the validity of the Business Property Relief claim in respect of REDACTED’s estate.

REDACTED’s IHT400 return states that the business assets comprised a property management and development business. I have conducted a review of the deceased’s individual tax returns and the tax returns of both REDACTED Ltd and REDACTED LLP but have not been able to identify any evidence of business activity beyond the holding of property as investments.”

HMRC are now claiming the IHT on the full amount, which runs into millions of pounds, in addition to interest on the unpaid IHT, which is racking up at a significant daily rate.

Conclusion

  • The planning does not work and if you have engaged in it, you will suffer losses;
  • Elysium Law has now been approached by numerous clients who have submitted claims for BPR during probate that have been rejected;
  • The deceased’s estate not only faces a significant increase in the IHT payable but also considerable interest, which is increasing daily as well as penalties;
  • We have not seen any advice from Chris Bailey or LT4L to contradict HMRC and Elysium Law believe that the Executors who have submitted claims for relief as a result, have a claim in professional negligence.

Elysium Law has an outstanding track record of bringing, defending, and settling high-value and complex cases.

Contact us today for more information if you have been affected, completing our enquiry page or call us at 0151-328-1968

CGT Rebasing – Why Less Tax For Landlord’s Planning Doesn’t Work

Elysium Law has posted several articles on this issue in recent weeks. Since HMRC’s Spotlight 63, we have been continuously approached by landlords who have entered into the planning with LT4L, Chris Bailey or the Bailey Group and they are concerned as to what the best course of action to take is.

At this point, it is probably wise to step back and look at the planning itself and why HMRC says it doesn’t work.

We will break down the key aspects of the planning and the claimed advantages of using it as well as providing HMRC’s view and our opinion of that.

The Structure

By now, especially as you may have used the planning, you will likely be familiar with the structure of the planning. Simply put:

  1. The Landlord (and/or family members) set up a Limited Company and an LLP with the Limited Company as a Corporate member of the LLP.
  2. The Landlord transfers their properties into the LLP and then the Landlord as an individual member of the LLP allocates profits to themselves remaining basic rate taxpayers, excess profits are then allocated to the Limited Company.
  3. The Corporate Member then claims a deduction for finance costs.

The Claimed CGT Advantages

LT4L and Chris Bailey claim that the planning results in a Base Cost Uplift to for Capital Gains Purposes to the date of transfer to the LLP

This means that when you come to sell the property, the Capital Gain is calculated on the value when the property was transferred into the LLP, which ordinarily will be higher than when you originally purchased it. The claim is therefore that this will result in a lower gain and consequently lower CGT being paid.

Our view is that LT4L’s planning is based on a total misconception that Incorporation Relief applies in this instance.

Our Analysis

If on the transfer into the LLP an element of Capital is transferred to the Company, then this element would be rebased for the Company, but that would also trigger an immediate CGT charge to the Client. Any disposal of a property from the LLP is treated as transparent and therefore the Client’s base cost is used to calculate CGT. HMRC explains this in example 2 here, which is taken from their Capital Gains Manual.

It is claimed by the scheme promotors that the Incorporation Relief rules apply here. To clarify HMRC states regarding Incorporation Relief:

“you may be able to delay paying Capital Gains Tax if you transfer your business to a company in return for shares”

HMRC

The fundamental flaw here is that you are not transferring your business to a COMPANY in exchange for SHARES, you are transferring it to an LLP – under a Trust arrangement, an entity which does not have shares.


The following questions regarding CGT rebasing were put to Chris Bailey by a trusted colleague of ours.

Trusted Advisor: “You advised that on the transfer into the LLP the properties would be rebased for CGT purposes. I questioned this and although I appreciate that they would be recorded in the LLP accounts at fair market value, on a disposal of a property the LLP would be treated as transparent and as such CLIENT’s base cost would be used for the purposes of the CGT calculation. You advised that this wouldn’t be the case and that he would only be subject to CGT on any growth from the date of contribution into the LLP. I can see that on the transfer into the LLP if an element of capital is transferred to the Company then this would rebase that element for the benefit of the company, but it would also trigger CGT on CLIENT’s disposal to the company. So, on the basis that no CGT is triggered on the transfer into the LLP, I assume that all capital is retained by CLIENT. This is demonstrated in HMRC example 2 on the attached: https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/capital-gains-manual/cg27940 where it demonstrates that the base cost for the disposal is the original base cost (not the uplifted market value).” (Trusted Advisor)

Chris Bailey: “An LLP is an incorporated partnership and as such the incorporation relief rules can be applied”.

Trusted Advisor: “How can incorporation relief apply to an LLP? Incorporation relief requires a person to transfer a business to a company in exchange for shares. The LLP is a corporate body, but it is not a company and cannot issue shares so I can’t see how this could apply or the impact it would have on CLIENT’ CGT base cost. Please can you clarify?”

Chris Bailey: “The LLP’s capital account is increased by the level of the equity. The same rules apply as in a company environment, in that if the LLP is closed down then the CGT would become payable – just as in a company environment.”

As you can see, the question remains unanswered.

Elysium Law has spoken to multiple individuals who used this planning and subsequently received a revised and unexpected CGT calculation from HMRC on the basis of the original value of the properties, not their rebased value as claimed by Chris Bailey.

This of course has resulted in a very large tax charge and had the individuals been aware, it would certainly have affected their decision to sell the properties.

Conclusion

Despite LT4L and Chris Bailey’s claims that there is a CGT Base Cost Uplift, Elysium Law has now been approached by numerous clients who have now had to pay CGT from the date of purchase of the assets, not the uplifted value.

We have seen no advice from Chris Bailey or LT4L as to what they should do, and our view is that they have a claim in professional negligence. Elysium Law has an outstanding track record of bringing, defending, and settling high-value and complex cases.

Contact us today for more information if you have been affected.

OCG Accountants: Their Advice To Do Nothing, Requests For Disclaimers and the Unanswered Questions

Elysium Law has received a number of requests for legal advice as to what to do in the face of the latest letter sent by Chris Bailey (of Less Tax for Landlords and the Bailey Group) on behalf of OCG Accountants.

The letter sent to their clients – which we are still considering in more detail – raises two points of concern.

Reliance

Given our experience in professional negligence claims, my colleague Ruby Keeler-Williams previously advised that advice from between Leading Counsel was NOT one that could be relied upon by the clients of Chris Bailey, LT4L or any other who sought advice. WE WERE CORRECT.

At the time of writing the article we had not seen any disclaimer. In their letter to their clients, OCG accountants set out extensively the excellent background and qualifications of Leading Counsel. However, we can now confirm that this caveat was provided further in the letter:

“We are writing this letter to you after taking (Leading Counsels) advice. However, (Leading Counsel) has asked us to make it clear to you that he is advising only OCG Accountants Ltd and not any of its Clients and that he cannot, for a number of reasons, himself accept any duty of care to any of you or to any other third party”.

Our previous warning has been proven correct. There is no duty of care between the Clients and Leading Counsel and they cannot rely upon his advice.

Who is advising Clients?

The letter then goes on to say:

“The advice to you in this letter thus comes from OCG Accountants Ltd. If you choose not to follow that advice, then we will need to discuss this with you and potentially ask you to sign a disclaimer that you are choosing not to follow our advice. This has been requested by the insurance broker who deals with our Professional Indemnity Insurance.”

This raises the question – what ‘advice’ are OCG giving their clients and are they insured to give such advice?

Our belief is that nothing contained within the letter amounts to advice, save for one small sentence, which advises Clients to do nothing.

We now ask Chris Bailey, Less Tax for Landlords, OCG Accountants or anyone else connected: What ‘advice’ have you been giving your Clients?

Given neither Chris Bailey or OCG accountants are qualified, regulated legal professionals, any advice given is not subject to legal professional privilege and as such can be disclosed.

The letter sets out Leading Counsel’s view, and Leading Counsel’s view as regurgitated in this letter is NOT advice to their Clients, as the retainer makes clear and CANNOT be relied upon by the Clients at all.

Therefore, every reference to what Leading Counsel has advised is of no consequence to the Clients. Further, OCG are not underwriting the advice via their retainer – the whole thing is arguably a smoke and mirror exercise.

The difference between Advice and Information

In claims of professional negligence, English law distinguishes between advice and information given to a client upon which the client may act if they chose. This is a complex area of law and is beyond the scope of this post.

Here, with one caveat as discussed later in this article, there is no advice given.

OCG are simply rehearsing Counsel’s view to their clients

Whilst Leading Counsel’s qualifications and experience are very impressive, rhetorically why is OCG setting this out to clients who cannot rely upon it.

You can read our previous post for more information on reliance upon Counsel’s advice.

The Caveat – OCG’s advice is to do nothing

Lest it be thought that OCG have not offered any advice to their clients. OCG have offered one piece of advice and that is to do nothing.

That one small piece of advice in the letter that may have significant consequences. It is predicated upon the basis that the client has received a nudge letter re Spotlight 63 (some clients of course having not):

“…we advise you on what should be your general response to such a letter…  do nothing in response to HMRCs letter.”  (our emphasis)

That advice does not tell you either:

  • What to do if you have not received a letter;  

and more importantly:

  • What the potential consequences are should you not respond either to the letter or to HMRC’s Spotlight 63 registration.

No doubt experienced tax advisers, with whom Elysium Law are currently working, will have far more questions and we are happy to receive them and expand the post.

The Request for a disclaimer – the iniquity of the uniformed choice

In our view, what seems to be iniquitous here is that Clients who are facing unknown consequences have so far received no advice from Chris Bailey, Less Tax for Landlords or OCG Accountants as to the way forward. The Clients are now given a stark choice with uninformed consequences – to sign or not to sign the disclaimer.

Elysium Law assumes (albeit OCG do not specify this) that this is an attempt to bar clients from bringing a claim under OCG Accountant’s Professional Indemnity Insurance should the clients chose not to follow the only piece of advice in the letter; namely to do nothing with regards to Spotlight 63, and should they go to independent and more experienced tax advisers who will give proper, informed, regulated advice.

We ask OCG and LT4L – why only now has this iniquity raised its head and upon what basis is the disclaimer sought?

LT4L and OCG Accountants have been aware of HMRC’s Spotlight 63 since at least 4th October 2023.

They ought to have informed their professional indemnity insurers at that stage of the potential of a claim or claims to be made.

Can they confirm to their clients that they have done so? If it is not the case, then why?

We therefore ask Chris Bailey and OCG Accountant the following questions:

(we invite every client of theirs to copy them and send them to Chris Bailey and the other Directors and demand answers)

  • Does the Schedule of Work in the Client Care Letter, which we assume is different to that sent by LT4L, cover work by OCG as regards any investigations/enquiries by HMRC?
  • Given that HMRC are aware of the LLPs registered at the office of OCG Accountants, what is the harm (or adverse consequences) to clients in simply registering under the Spotlight?
  • Do you accept that registration is not an automatic admission of any tax that HMRC claim to be owed?
  • In the event that a Client does not register, will this expose them to issues such as, but not limited to, greater penalties or possibly the unavailability of any settlement facility?
  • If more penalties and interest may (or do) occur as a result of OCG’s advice, will OCG’s insurance cover ALL penalties and interest that accrue to each and every affected client as a result?
  • Was it a term of any original contract and did you point out that any insurance might be invalid, as we believe you intimate, if the clients did not stay with you in the event of HMRC issues? If not, why not?
  • If this is an attempt at variation of the contract or at exclusion for liability in some form of new contract, have you considered the legislation that protects consumers against unfair exclusion clauses and contractual terms?  If not, why not?
  • Rather the discussing matters with individuals, which may go unrecorded in the event of a dispute, will you set out in clear and unequivocal terms so that your clients can take independent legal advice as to the basis of the disclaimer, its validity and consequences if signed?
  • Will you tell your clients that they should take independent advice before signing the disclaimer? If not, why not?
  • Acting in the interest of your clients and not your own interests or the interests of a third party such as the insurance broker or the underwriter, have you considered whether there could be a conflict of interest in asking the Clients to sign this Disclaimer? Clearly it would suit OCG and their insurers if the clients had signed such a disclaimer, but is that in the best interests of the clients? As set out at paragraph 12 of the ICAEW’s Guidance on identifying and managing conflicts, in relation to self-interest conflicts, the test is whether: “…the member (OCG) can give, and be seen by a reasonable and informed third party to give, objective advice or service.’
  • If you assert that you have considered this and are compliant with it, will you let your clients see your written correspondence with the Broker as to why the disclaimer is sought now and prima facie at least, is not in the interests of the plethora of clients you currently represent?
  • Does the Broker have any interest in protecting themselves in making the request?
  • Has the Broker told you why this request is being made, or upon whose authority, and pointed out to you under the original PII policy that your clients will be covered only in the event that you continue to act even in the face of a significant and serious conflict of interest?
  • Finally, please tell us all now the consequences of not signing the disclaimer as regards your Professional Indemnity Insurance and what you will say to those who want to seek advice elsewhere.

Once again, Elysium Law invite each and every client of OCG/LT4L to reproduce these questions and send them to OCG demanding an immediate response.

Conclusion

The January 31st deadline for registration is upon the users of the planning and we have numerous affected who, rather like a rabbit in the headlines, are caught without knowing the proper way forward.

OCG’s advice, namely to do nothing, cannot seriously be considered as responsible advice such as would be expected from a competent, independent advisor unless they have considered and set out the consequences of following their advice.

We urge their clients to write to them, setting out and adopting our questions. In the meantime, seek independent advice on registration and its potential consequences.

Elysium Law has an outstanding track record of bringing, defending, and settling high-value and complex cases. With a significant number of taxpayers likely to be affected following Spotlight 63, we are looking to advance a group claim. Contact us today for more information and a free consultation.

Less Tax for Landlords – Are they acting in the best interests of their Clients?

Elysium Law understands that Less Tax for Landlords and OCG Accountants have instructed Leading Counsel (KC) about the tax issues relating to income tax distribution, questions about which have been raised by various tax professionals concerning the hybrid LLP planning.

HMRC’s view (and that of every other tax expert) is that the planning does not work. HMRC’s views are set out in Spotlight 63. They can be seen here.

We have several observations:

Potential Conflict of Interest

We fail to understand why LT4L, Chris Bailey and OCG Accountants are continuing to advise clients who may have suffered loss as a result of the planning.

Our view is that clients who may have been affected require independent advice in evaluating their options, specifically tax advice and the possibility of bringing legal action against LT4L, Chris Bailey and/or OCG Accountants. Accordingly, ongoing representation represents a conflict of interest, and it cannot confidently be said that LT4L, OCG Accountants or Chris Bailey are in a position to advise their clients independently and objectively.

If you are a client of LT4L, Chris Bailey or OCG Accountants, our advice is that you seek urgent advice from a competent and respected tax professional, register following Spotlight 63, ascertain all or any tax liabilities and seek advice from legal professionals.

Is it only income tax that affects the clients in the planning?

The simple answer is no.

At this stage, we anticipate the potential liabilities are as follows:

  • Income tax payments, including interest and penalties;
  • Capital Gains Tax liabilities (potentially by clients who have sold property) – The transfer into an LLP does not give you a base cost uplift as advised by LT4L and Chris Bailey;
  • Inheritance Tax – It is generally accepted that Business Property Relief cannot be claimed upon the death of the partners under this planning.
  • SDLT – as changes in LLP profit sharing automatically trigger SDLT charges under FA 2003, Sch 15, para 14

Elysium Law has been approached by one client who informs us that he sold properties under the mistaken belief of a CGT uplift which is not available, and he had a revised CGT bill of £800,000. There MUST be others in this position.

Clients should be asking LT4L how their instructions to Counsel deal with this, as on the current information their clients have, they don’t appear to.

Can clients rely on Counsels’ advice – who are the clients for the purposes of the retainer?

Traditionally, it was a ‘selling point’ widely used by the tax avoidance scheme providers that ‘Leading Counsel’ had advised. Mostly these were eminent Counsel, with the providers themselves using these ‘names’ to give a form of comfort blanket to the participants who felt very secure knowing that Leading Counsel had advised.

The problem with this is that no matter who Counsel is or was, Counsel’s instructions and advice are governed by the retainer. Leading Counsel will very likely not be retained to advise you. Counsel will likely be retained to advise LT4L or any other of the named entities. In that case, there is no relationship between you as the end client and Counsel and as such his/her advice cannot be relied upon by you. Counsel, we believe, is instructed to advise LT4L and OCG Accountants and only has a duty of care towards them

An example of this is the recent case of McLean v Thornhill [2023] EWCA Civ 466, where it was held that a tax barrister advising the promoter of a tax avoidance scheme owed no duty of care to the tax avoiders who invested in it, even though they had been allowed to see his advice.

In those circumstances, if a client relies on the advice given by LT4L’s KC, and either in the event the advice is not correct, or HMRC does not agree with Counsel’s views, there is no recourse by their clients.

What if HMRC disagrees with Counsel’s views as put forward by LT4L?

If HMRC disagrees with Counsel’s views, the only answer is for you to litigate the matter with HMRC, and this will take considerable time (years) and very significant expense. It is not clear who will pay that expense and it is not at all clear that LT4L insurance will fund this litigation and pay any tax and penalties due to HMRC (as LT4L has informed clients).

The insurance provider will be acting via their solicitors (not via LT4L or any of their representatives) and will not simply ‘payout’ claims. The only way a recovery can be made is by bringing a claim against LT4L and their insurance provider in negligence and breach of contract.

In our further articles, we will demonstrate the effect that relying upon this advice will have on your ability to bring a claim against LT4L or any others who advised that this planning was reliable.

Have the criticisms of the overall planning been answered by LT4L?

The short answer is NO. The informed views namely that the planning does not work, have NEVER been contradicted by Chris Bailey or LT4L since the ineffectiveness of the planning was exposed, principally by Dan Neidle of Tax Policy Associates.

Limitation

There are time limits to bringing civil claims, including claims made against Insurance Companies. These are known as limitation periods. Once those limits have expired, you have no options open to you and your claims will be time-barred, no matter how well-founded.

You must obtain independent and objective legal advice within the limitation period. LT4L will have a complete defence to any claims brought against them once the limitation period has expired.

Conclusion

The deadline to register for Spotlight 63 is rapidly approaching. If you have been affected, you must obtain independent, objective tax advice now.

Furthermore, Elysium Law is still receiving enquiries from clients affected. You can contact us via telephone or email for a free initial consultation.

Elysium Law has an outstanding track record of bringing, defending, and settling high-value and complex cases. With a significant number of taxpayers who are likely to be affected following Spotlight 63, we are looking to advance a group claim. Contact us today for more information