Book a free consultation

STANDSTILL AGREEMENTS AND HMRC

In this article David Brogelli discusses the use of a Standstill Agreement specifically in disputes with HMRC but also their relevance in wider applications.

Limitation

The Limitation Act 1980 sets out specific time limits for certain actions to be brought.

A Claimant’s failure to do so is an absolute bar to bringing the Claim, but the defence of limitation must be pleaded in any Defence.

Note, the court will not simply strike out a claim of its own motion.

Recently, Elysium Law has been approached by a number of clients who, either as individuals or via their Company entered Tax Avoidance Schemes all of which were registered under DoTAS.

Not surprisingly, HMRC has issued determinations under Regulation 80 of the Income Tax Pay As You Earn and Regulation 2003 and  Section 8 of the Social Security (Transfer of Contributions) regulations 2001.

Again, not surprisingly, given the planning arrangements and various challenges most of these assessments have been the subject of an appeal with the tax held over pending the outcome.

As far as the collection of National Insurance Contributions are concerned, this is a contractual debt. HMRC is therefore bound by the provisions of Section 5 of the act in that any claims for a debt must be issued within the 6-years period, failing which the Taxpayer can raise limitation as an absolute bar to the claim.

For the avoidance of doubt, the NIC is due from the year in which it should have been paid and not of course from the date of the assessment.

The Letter of Claim and the Pre-Action Protocol for debt Claims

HMRC is not bound by the pre-action protocol on debts.

Their position is covered by Practice Direction 7 D Section 1.1 (e).

Generally, if a defence is filed, the court will fix a date for a hearing and the only evidence that is needed from HMRC is a certificate – the PD goes on to state;

3.1 On the hearing date the court may dispose of the claim.

(Section 25A(1) and (2) of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (‘the 2005 Act’) provides that a certificate of an officer of Revenue and Customs that, to the best of that officer’s knowledge and belief, a sum payable to the Commissioners under or by virtue of an enactment or by virtue of a contract settlement (within the meaning of section25(6) of the 2005 Act) has not been paid, is sufficient evidence that the sum mentioned in the certificate is unpaid.)

The ’PD’ goes on to state:

3.2 But exceptionally, if the court does not dispose of the claim on the hearing date it may give case management directions, which may if the defendant has filed a defence, include allocating the case.

Protective proceedings and the issue of a Claim

In their Particulars of Claim HMRC say:

“The Claim is issued to protect the Claimant’s right to NICs that it considers to be correctly due…once the Claim is issued, it is the Claimants intention to make application to the court for a general adjournment pending the outcome of the Defendant’s appeal.”

As far as the issue fee is concerned, most if not all of these cases fall into the County Court and the issue fee is payable in the sum of 5% of the amount alleged to be owed. In the event that the Claimant loses the claim, the disbursement as well as any cost will automatically follow the event as will interest on the debt, which must be pleaded in the Claim.

In the majority of cases, HMRC has written to the various Defendants and has threatened proceedings.

Prior to issuing proceedings, it is prudent that HMRC is offered a standstill agreement in order to stop time running during the limitation period. We believe that this will protect the Taxpayer on the question of costs should the challenge to the planning fail and the NICs become due and payable, as at that stage, there can be no defence to the Claim.

Standstill Agreements

In our view and in order to protect your client or yourself on costs, we suggest that you offer HMRC a standstill agreement under which the Claimant agrees not to rely on the expiry of a limitation period as a defence and which runs from a given date (usually the date of the agreement) until notice is given to restart the claim.

This will, in effect, freeze the running of time at the date of the agreement, while giving the Defendant the option to start the clock running again by giving notice to the claimant. Of course, if the Defendant taxpayer wanted to restart the claim before the planning issues had been decided by for example the FTT, then HMRC would be within its rights to issue and stay the claim. This would result in no costs protection for the Defendant, on the contrary.

How is time stood still?

There is a difference between extending time and suspending time for limitation purposes.

An agreement to suspend time (Standstill Agreement) is set out in the following way.

The suspension of time under this agreement shall continue in force until the earlier of:

(a) 30 days after the service by any party of a notice stating that the running of time is to recommence; or

 (b) the service of proceedings by any party in connection with the Dispute; or

 (c) [add in a long stop date] or an event such as determination of the issues taken by HMRC (mention the planning).

 In this case, upon the conclusion of the trigger event, the remainder of the limitation period would run.

If however, the Parties decide to contract to extend the limitation this will expire on the date set out in the agreement.

 The author’s view is that the suspension of time is by far the safest way of proceeding.

 If you want to know more about standstill agreements or want advice upon litigation against HMRC, or any other party, then contact us www.elysium-law.com

‘Who is really controlling this litigation?’ Non-Party Costs Orders

In this article Richard Gray Barrister looks at the courts power to issue costs against a non-party; that is a party who is not directly involved in the litigation. Such orders may be considered against directors of an impecunious company formed only to protect the real litigators by the proposed use of the Company to litigate the claim.

The Statutory basis and the overall grounds for the award

Section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, which is governed by CPR 46.2, gives the court power to award a non-party costs order. The award can be made in any court and the court is asked to exercise its jurisdiction to make it.

Generally, the only criterion for its application is whether, in all the circumstances, it is just to make the order. This is fact specific in each case.

Considerations for the Court to make the order

The court must consider whether the non-party is the (real) party interested in the outcome of the litigation, or

(i)         whether they have been responsible for bringing the proceedings; and

(ii)        that those proceedings were brought in bad faith; or

(iii)       there is some other conduct, which in all the circumstances, justifies the court in making the order.

It is not enough simply that the non-party is the sole director and controlling mind of a company. If, however, the interests of a company and its director were so close, it could be considered just to make the order against the director personally, the court will do so. Again, much is fact dependent and needs to be considered during the litigation.

If the non-party acted without impropriety or on legal advice, this does not prevent an order being made against them. However, a non-party costs order may be more likely to be made when the applicant can show improper conduct of litigation. See Turvill v Bird and others [2016] EWCA Civ 703

  • It will be exceptional for an order for costs to be made against a non-party where the applicant has a cause of action against the non-party and could have joined them as a party to the original proceedings.
  • There must be a costs order made against the primary party and there is no power to order the non-party to pay costs beyond those ordered to be paid by the claimant or defendant in the particular litigation.

Litigation Funders for Claimants

Generally, the jurisdiction will not be exercised against litigation funders meaning “those with no personal interest in the litigation, who do not stand to benefit from it and in no way seek to control its course.” (Hamilton v Al Fayed and others [2002] EWCA Civ 665)

Conversely however, there is authority to say that such orders can be issued against third-party funders who fund defences. See Merchantbridge & Co v Safron General Partner & another [2011] EWCH 1524.

Note however that if the funder effectively controls or participates in it, then they may be liable. See the case of  Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd and others [2005] EWCA Civ 655

Causation

This is by no means settled law and the review of the authorities as to its necessity is beyond the scope of this article.

In Byrne v South Sefton Health Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 1904 the court said that it was necessary to determine whether the conduct complained of was really an effective cause of the costs incurred.

Generally, if there is no causation, whilst it may be possible to obtain the order, the granting of such orders will be rare.

An Application for Security for Costs – is it a prerequisite to the making of the order?

In any proposed litigation brought by a Company, a seasoned litigator would apply for security for their clients costs pursuant to CPR 25.

Those considerations will be the subject of a separate article given the litigation Our Clients are threatened with currently.  

Principles that the Court will consider in granting the order against a director

The court will consider the following non-exhaustive) principles:

(i)            Despite not being a party to the litigation, does the court consider that the non-party director properly be described as ‘the real party to the litigation’

(ii)        Where proceedings by an insolvent company are funded by a non-party solely or substantially for their own financial benefit, they should be liable for the costs, if the action brought or defended fails.

(iii)       To succeed impropriety need not be shown.

Section 51 orders may be made to avoid the injustice of an individual director hiding behind a Company and engaging in what they see as risk-free litigation for his own purposes (Re North West Holdings PLC and another [2001] EWCA Civ 67).

Such orders will not be made however where the Director is acting in proceedings to, for example protect shareholders. Of note here is that where a liquidator brings proceedings, the court will not usually make such an order.

In order to assess whether the director was the real party to the litigation, the question will be whether the individual director was seeking to benefit personally from the litigation.

It follows therefore, that before embarking upon funding of such litigation parties and their advisors are warned to consider whether in doing so, they are placing themselves at risk of being the recipient of such an order.

Conclusion

The courts power to award costs against non-parties is a significant incentive to dissuade others to encourage risky litigation. Where claims are made by Companies, litigators instructed to defend such claims should consider this power early in the proceedings and warn the other side in any pre-action correspondence.

If you require more information or are think of instructing a firm to act for you or your Company in litigation, then please email clerks@elysium-law.com or visit our website.

Deed of Assignment and the Notice of Assignment -What is the Difference?

In this article, Richard Gray barrister takes a brief look at the differences between a Deed of Assignment and a Notice of Assignment and the effect of the assignment on the contracting party

At the end of 2020, Elysium Law were instructed to act for a significant number of clients in relation to claims made by a company known as Felicitas Solutions Ltd (an Isle of Man Company) for recovery of loans which had been assigned out of various trust companies following loan planning entered into by various employees/contractors.

Following our detailed response, as to which please see the article on our website written by my colleague Ruby Keeler-Williams, the threatened litigation by way of debt claims seem to disappear. It is important to note that the original loans had been assigned by various Trustees to Felicitas, by reason of which, Felicitas stood in the shoes of the original creditor, which allowed the threatened action to be pursued.

After a period of inertia, Our Clients, as well as others, have been served with demand letters by a new assignee known as West 28th Street Ltd. Accompanying the demand letters is a Notice of Assignment, by reason of which the Assignee has informed the alleged debtor of the Assignees right to enforce the debt.

Following two conferences we held last week and a number of phone call enquiries which we have received, we have been asked to comment upon the purport and effect of the Notice of Assignment, which the alleged debtors have received. Questions such as what does this mean (relating to the content) but more importantly is the ‘Notice’ valid?

Here I want to look briefly at the differences between the two documents.

 

There is no need for payment to make the assignment valid and therefore it is normally created by Deed.

 The creation of a legal assignment is governed by Section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925:

136 Legal assignments of things in action.

(1)Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of charge only) of any debt or other legal thing in action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to claim such debt or thing in action, is effectual in law (subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee) to pass and transfer from the date of such notice—

(a) the legal right to such debt or thing in action;

(b) all legal and other remedies for the same; and

(c) the power to give a good discharge for the same without the concurrence of the assignor:

Some of the basic requirements for a legal assignment are;

  • The assignment must not be subject to conditions.
  • The rights to be assigned must not relate to only part of a debt, or other legal chose in action.
  • The assignment must be in writing and signed by the assignor.
  • The other party or parties to the agreement must be given notice of the assignment.

 

Notice of assignment

To create a legal assignment, section 136 requires that express notice in writing of the assignment must be given to the other contracting party (the debtor).

 

Notice must be in writing

Section 136 of the LPA 1925 requires “express notice in writing” to be given to the other original contracting party (or parties).

 Must the notice take any particular form?

The short answer is no. Other than the requirement that it is in writing, there is no prescribed form for the notice of assignment or its contents. However, common sense suggests that the notice must clearly identify the agreement concerned.

Can we  challenge the Notice?

No. You can challenge the validity of the assignment assignment by ‘attacking the Deed, which must conform with Section 136. In this specific case, the Notice sent by West 28th Street in itself is valid. Clearly, any claims made must be effected by a compliant Deed and it is that which will require detailed consideration before any right to claim under the alleged debt is considered.

Can I demand sight of the assignment agreement

On receiving a notice of assignment, you may seek to satisfy yourself that the assignment has in fact taken place. The Court of Appeal has confirmed that this is a valid concern, but that does not give an automatic right to require sight of the assignment agreement.

In Van Lynn Developments Limited v Pelias Construction Co [1969]1QB 607  Lord  Denning said:

“After receiving the notice, the debtor will be entitled, of course, to require a sight of the assignment so as to be satisfied that it is valid…”

The Court of Appeal subsequently confirmed this  stating the contracting party is entitled to satisfy itself that a valid absolute assignment has taken place, so that it can be confident the assignee can give it a good discharge of its obligations

Summary

The important document is the Deed of Assignment, which sets out the rights assigned by the Assignor. The Notice of Assignment is simply a communication that there has been an assignment. The deed is governed by Section 136 of the LP 1925. It should be possible to obtain a copy of the Deed prior to any action taken in respect of it.

For more information on the claims by West 28th Street or if advice is needed on the drafting of a Deed, then please call us on 0151-328-1968 or visit www.elysium-law.com.

Employee Benefit Trusts – Use, But Don’t Abuse

In this article Richard Gray Barrister gives an overview on the use of Employee Benefit Trusts and considers, even though the aggressive EBT schemes are a thing of the past, whether they are still being considered principally as a vehicle to avoid Inheritance Tax (IHT) and the potential pitfalls should that occur.

Having just finished a lengthy conference with a client, I was reminded of something a colleague of mine said, namely that; “Google is not kind to EBTs”.  If you were to Google the point, that appears to be correct and in this case the Client threw many questions at me surrounding the abusive arrangements for which they had previously been used. We now know all too well the effect of those arrangements and the misery they generated.

Aggressive schemes apart, there is very much a place for an EBT within the context of proper business planning and recently, Elysium Law has advised upon their use in the sale of a trading company where, prior to implementation, HMRC gave clearance.

Regrettably, there is still a temptation to use them purely as a vehicle for avoiding IHT and in this article I look at the consequences of the misuse of an EBT and simply ‘getting it wrong’.

Be warned of the use of an EBT in, for example, a small family company who just after incorporation of an investment portfolio now wants to avoid IHT by placing the shares into an EBT. It won’t work!

What is an EBT?

An EBT is a type of discretionary trust set up to fall within the definition of a trust for the benefit of employees within the provisions of Section 86 of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (IHTA 1984). This provides exemptions from inheritance tax (IHT) for certain transactions involving qualifying EBTs.

Special Treatment of Section 86 Trusts

The following should be noted in relation to a section 86 trust

It is not a relevant property trust;

A section 86 trust is not a relevant property trust.  Relevant property trusts are subject to the specific inheritance tax regime in Chapter III, Part III of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984. Therefore, a section 86 trust it is not subject to the IHT charges such as the exit charge and the ten-yearly charge.

Transfer of Value to an EBT

If a close company makes a transfer of value to an EBT, this will be a chargeable transfer, apportioned to the participators under section 94, IHTA 1984.

There are, however, four possible reliefs and exemptions that may be available:

  • Dispositions not intended to confer a gratuitous benefit;
  • Dispositions allowable for corporation tax.
  • Disposition for the benefit of employees.
  • Business property relief.

Section 13 of the Act deals with transfers of value into the Trust.

Consideration is then to be given to the effects of Section 239 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992., which gives the exemption of CGT for the ‘transfer in’ of the assets.

Inheritance tax

Section 28, IHTA 1984 provides that a transfer of value by an individual to an EBT will be an exempt transfer where the following condition is satisfied:

  • The EBT is a section 86 trust with restricted beneficiaries.

However, the reliefs granted are subject to anti avoidance provisions without which it would be easy to use the EBT exemptions to transfer wealth from one generation of a family to another without adverse IHT and CGT consequences

Should an EBT be considered abusive by HMRC, then the trust will be treated as a Relevant Property Trust and a short contrast with that regime, as opposed to EBTs, must be considered.

Inheritance Tax considerations

Lifetime gifts into discretionary trusts are chargeable lifetime transfers (CLTs).  IHT will be charged at the lifetime rate of 20% on the amount above the settlor’s nil rate band. There is

10-year periodic charge

Discretionary trusts are ‘relevant property’ trusts because the trust assets are not included in the taxable estate of any of the beneficiaries, the trust itself will be assessed to IHT. That means that on each 10-year anniversary the trust is taxed on the value of the trust less the nil rate band available to the trust. The rate they pay on this excess is 6% (calculated as 30% of the lifetime rate, currently 20%).

Capital Gains Tax – Gifts into trust

Lifetime gifts of existing assets into trust, other than gifts of cash or the assignment of investment bonds, will be disposals for CGT.

During the life of the trust

If the trustees dispose of trust assets the gains are calculated in the same way as for an individual and taxed at the trust rates of CGT. The trust rates are 20% or 28% for residential property.

If the EBT is reclassified by HMRC as a Relevant Property Trust, then penalties and interest will apply and therefore extreme caution must be exercised when advising on the set up of the EBT

DoTAS and the final word

Again, a detailed consideration of these provisions is beyond the scope of this article, but advisors should consider whether placing shares in a small investment company with no employees will fall within the DoTAS legislation. In my view it does and the temptation to do this must be avoided

IHT hallmark a revision from the previous legislation

The IHT arrangement Regulations 2017 were made on 29 November 2017 and came into force on 1 April 2018, replacing the previous IHT hallmark.

Arrangements to which the IHT hallmark applies

The IHT hallmark applies to arrangements if it would be reasonable to expect an informed observer to conclude that both of the conditions below are met.

Condition 1

The main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangements is to enable a person to obtain one or more of a list of specific advantages in relation to IHT (tax advantage).

The specific advantages are:

  • The avoidance or reduction of a relevant property entry charge, the ten-year anniversary and exit charges.

(Regulation 4(2), IHT Arrangements Regulations 2017.)

Condition 2

The arrangements involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps without which a tax advantage could not be obtained.

(Regulation 4(3), IHT Arrangements Regulations 2017.)

EBTs if used properly have a significant place in Tax and Business planning. If you want further advice upon the use EBTs, EOTs and of an EBT upon the proposed sale of trading company, then contact us via email at clerks@elysium-law.com or call 0151 328 1968

Contractors – the ‘loans’ you never needed to repay

In this article, Ruby Keeler-Williams and Richard Gray Barrister of Elysium Law consider claims made against loan charge contractors and the litigation which subsequently ensued and is contemplated going forward.

The ‘Contractor Loan Scheme’ Planning

The ‘contractor loan scheme’ was part of a large-scale marketed tax avoidance scheme. The user would usually be an individual working for what is called an umbrella company or for their own personal service company. Normally, that would attract tax and NICs on a PAYE basis. The responsibility for paying such statutory deductions falls upon the employer. However, in an attempt to reduce tax liability, the employer, who would be acting under a contract of employment would pay the employee the minimum wage and then do one of two things:

  • Pay lumps sums to a trustee who would ‘loan’ the employee (now beneficiary under a trust) money (remuneration) with the arrangements setting out the terms of the repayment.
  • Alternatively, the employer would directly loan the monies collected and then assign the loans to a trust later.

By way of example; if an employee was paid a salary of £150,000, only a basic minimum wage would be paid. Then 85% of what was left (collected by the umbrella company) was ‘loaned’ to the employee and the umbrella would take what was left. It was argued under these schemes that the loan did not constitute earnings and as such was not taxable. “Don’t worry we have Counsel’s advice” was the normal selling point.

Another and more significant inducement was made to the employee that the loan would never need repaying. We have a particular legal view on that arrangement but at he very least it was a misrepresentation which materially induced the employee to enter the contractual arrangements.

The Assignment out of the Trust

Unusually, the purported ‘loans’ in many cases have been assigned out of the Trust and have either directly or via other companies ended up being assigned to a company named Felicitas Solutions Ltd, which was formed and based in the Isle of Man. The company appeared to be purposely set up to receive these assignments and pursue claims for reimbursement from behind the corporate veil, as they threatened to do.

The users of these schemes were then contacted with demands for repayment and as a result many sought advice from Elysium Law and we were instructed by a large group to defend these claims.

The Claims

The ‘demand for repayment’ letters received by Our Clients did not constitute a compliant Letter of Claim under the Pre-Action Protocol. As such, we insisted that prior to providing a response, a compliant Letter of Claim must be produce supported by evidence.

In early 2021, this was provided to us and some 107,000 pages of documents were disclosed and reviewed.

It was clear from the review of these documents, together with evidence from Our Clients, that the loans were ‘circular’ and were never intended to be repaid. This was clearly a tax avoidance arrangement, and the loans were, in our view, unenforceable.

Our stance  was to offer a mediation in order to narrow the issues in dispute.

Following that Mediation, Elysium Law subsequently served upon Felicitas a comprehensive letter of response that rebutted the claims on the following grounds:

  • Collateral Contract and/or Misrepresentation, in that a legal assignment is subject to existing causes of action which are not avoided by assignment (Bibby Factors Northwest Ltd v HFD Ltd). This means that the Beneficiaries may raise against the assignee, any defence, set-off or counterclaim which they could raise if sued by the assignor. Here, there was a verbal collateral contract made that this was a tax avoidance arrangement and that the ‘loan’ would never be enforced against them.
  • Breach of Trust, in that the Trusts into which the user’s money paid was subject to both express and implied fiduciary obligations. The assignment would likely have substantially devalued the assets of the trust and has exploited the beneficiaries.

After service of the letter of response, to which we received no reply, the threat of litigation seemed to disappear.

However, Elysium Law are now aware that last week, a large number (if not all) of these ‘loans’ have been assigned by Felicitas to a company known as West 28th Street Limited, who have subsequently sent letters demanding repayment, albeit they have made an offer to settle at a reduced rate of 50% adding that if the offer is not accepted they will instruct Solicitors to claim from the recipients. We have been contacted by our previous clients seeking further advice and have organised conferences after hours to assist them.

Our view is that action must be taken to ensure that these demands for repayment and subsequent assignments do not continue.

Elysium Law have a litigation strategy to bring these claims to an end. If you have received one of these demands from Felicitas or West 28th Street Limited and wish to have advice on this matter, please contact Elysium Law on 0151 328 1968 or via clerks@elysium-law.com.

Incorporation of a Property Portfolio

In this article Richard Gray, Barrister of Elysium Law considers the tax reliefs available as well as the evidential and anti-avoidance issues to be considered when incorporating a property portfolio into a Company. The article takes not only a brief look at case law but considers the advisors retainer and the practical steps to be taken with the client when undertaking such work.

Much has been written about the incorporation of a property portfolio from a partnership into a limited company.

It is important to remember that the whole transaction consists of two elements

(i)         Incorporation of a business; and

(ii)        Transfer of the partnership

Clients (and sometimes their advisors) confuse the two, but each is a separate and distinct consideration.

To a considerable extent, each is fact specific and based upon evidence, which the advisor and their clients should be able to refer to should the claim for Roll-over Relief be challenged by HMRC and/or the issue of the existence of a partnership, is also called into question.

The Legislation -Rollover Relief Taxation to Chargeable Gains Act 1992

162 Roll-over relief on transfer of business

(1)        This section shall apply for the purposes of this Act where a person who is not a company transfers to a company a business as a going concern, together with the whole assets of the business, or together with the whole of those assets other than cash, and the business is so transferred wholly or partly in exchange for shares issued by the company to the person transferring the business.

The legislation does not define the term ‘business’ and largely as one may know, the matter is dealt with in case law and by the evidence produced by the taxpayer as to the carrying on of a business should there be a challenge for the relief claimed. The classic case is that of  Elisabeth Moyne Ramsay v HMRC[1] (but again, there is no defining one size fits all factual scenario) and the issue is therefore fact specific to each case. Records of any business activity should be capable of being produced if required and by all persons within the business.

Further examples can be found in case law but be advised, that HMRC will not give non-statutory clearance on this point. It is down to the taxpayer and perhaps the advisor to formulate the case and be able to meet any anticipated challenge from HMRC.

Invariably, the accountant/advisor will know the client, but it is important that in drafting the retainer letter, the advisor should attribute the ultimate responsibility to the client, if possible, as to the facts of how the enterprise was run, which should be recorded in a comprehensive file note and sent by detailed letter to the client for confirmation and signature.

Be aware however, that in drafting the retainer, the incorporation will have been brought about possibly upon the accountant’s advice and unless seeking independent advice such as from Counsel, the accountant/advisor should really acquaint themselves with the facts and give the client a full explanation of the cases on the point if necessary. Please also be aware that the client will invariably be a consumer and any attempt to limit or exclude liability must be considered in the light of Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. In a case where there is a large claim for such relief, it may be advisable to seek advice from Counsel and instruct Counsel to draft the appropriate retainer letter.

Debt/Equity – Point to remember

Rollover relief can be claimed only where the equity in the properties is more than the Capital Gain. It is important that clients understand the debt/equity position. Whilst acting for them during their business they should have made full disclosure as to any re-mortgaging of the properties and what they have done with the money acquired. If that money has been removed from the portfolio and spent on anything outside of it, then the incorporation may not be possible unless the debt is repaid prior to incorporation or regardless of withdrawal, there is still enough equity in the properties. Again, use a simple analogy such as re-mortgaging for a new private residence. In a removal situation the gain will be more than the equity in all probability, but the client should set the facts down and then undertake the calculation. Remember, that the information given relies upon the accuracy of the client. Therefore, the retainer letter should exclude any liability for the information given. An example of the calculation is given in HMRC manual CG65740.

Partnerships and SDLT relief

Partnership as transferor

Given that the consideration is for shares then the payment of SDLT will be calculated on the value of the shares.

Section 53 of the Finance Act 2003 and the Market Value Rule

53 Deemed market value where transaction involves connected company

(1)        This section applies where the purchaser is a company and—

(a)        the vendor is connected with the purchaser, or

(b)        some or all of the consideration for the transaction consists of the issue or transfer of shares in a company with which the vendor is connected.

(1A)     The chargeable consideration for the transaction shall be taken to be not less than—

(a)        the market value of the subject-matter of the transaction as at the effective date of the transaction.

(4)        Where this section applies paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 (exemption of transactions for which there is no chargeable consideration) does not apply.

But this section has effect subject to any other provision affording exemption or relief from stamp duty land tax.

Where there is a transfer at Market Value to a connected Company an SDLT charge will therefore arise.

Generally

FA2003, Schedule 15, para 18 onwards applies to the transfer of a chargeable interest from either a Partnership or an LLP[2] and will apply upon an incorporation where the existing business is operated through a Partnership or LLP.

The calculation at para 20 (“Transfer Of Chargeable Interest from a Partnership: Sum of The Lower Proportions”) provides that the chargeable consideration will be equal to the % of the income rights changing hands applied to the market value of the property.

The shares should be issued in proportion to the partnership income.

SDLT relief will not be available if shares are issued disproportionately to the capital in the partnership.

It appears that HMRC accept that FA2003, Schedule 15 takes effect in priority to the market value rule in s53 of the Finance Act 2003. This means that no SDLT would be chargeable if the transfer came from a partnership or limited partnership providing that the steps in paragraphs 18-22 of Schedule 15, are followed. Again, the existence of a partnership is a matter for the individual client, and one cannot simply undertake a ‘one size fits all’ approach.

Of note is paragraph 17A of Schedule 15. Essentially, if value is removed from the partnership within 3 years of land being transferred to it, where there was no SDLT or reduced SDLT by a partner or connected person[3] then paragraph 17A operates to produce a charge. However, incorporation does not remove the property and Schedule 17 will not apply.

Two points of importance also must be recognised:

  • This rule appears to be an anomaly in the legislation in that partners are favoured in this way. In that respect a partnership deed should be in existence, or the accounts treated as partnership accounts. One cannot retrospectively draw up partnership accounts if they have not been operated in this way previously.
  • Partnership and Co-ownership are NOT the same. There must be evidence of one partner being able to bind another and a separate bank account being operated. All must agree to share profits and losses[4].

There are two cases with which the advisor should be familiar.

As to the existence of a business and a partnership one needs to refer to the case of  SC Properties and Another v Commissioners for HM Revenue & Customs.

For the purpose of this article, we propose to concentrate upon the partnership issue that arose in the case. The Partnership itself was not registered with HMRC until February 2019, which was long after the property transactions which were the subject of the tax dispute had occurred. Whilst the appellants (but strangely not one of the partners Mrs Cooke who did not give evidence) argued that the partnership occurred in 2014, HMRC rejected this. Whilst Partnership accounts were prepared for 2015-2017, and a Partnership return was filed for 2017 HMRC argued that on the facts there was no business (there being no mention of a partnership) and that neither Section 162 nor Schedule 15 applied.

As far as the existence of a partnership is concerned guidance was had by reference to the case of  Burnett v Barker [2021] 3332(Ch)

This case calls very much into question certain assumptions that advisors make when looking at the question of the existence of a partnership. Whilst this case was not on the point of the SDLT relief that is often sought, it nevertheless discloses interesting issues set out in the Partnership Act 1890.

Section 1(1) of the Partnership Act 1890 provides:

Definition of partnership

1. (1) Partnership is the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view of profit.

From the statutory definition it appears that before a partnership can be said to exist, three conditions must be satisfied, i.e. there must be:

(1) a business;

(2) which is carried on by two or more persons in common;

(3) with “a view of profit”

Section 2 of the Partnership Act 1890 sets out certain rules for determining the existence of a partnership:

Rules for determining existence of partnership

2. In determining whether a partnership does or does not exist regard shall be had to the following rules:

(1)       Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, joint property, common property or part ownership does not of itself create a partnership as to anything so held or owned, whether the tenants or owners do or do not share any profits made by the use thereof.

(2)       The sharing of gross returns does not of itself create a partnership, whether the persons sharing such returns have or have not a joint or common right or interest in any property from which or from the use of which the returns are derived.

(3)       The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but the receipt of such a share, or of a payment contingent on or varying with the profits of a business does not of itself make him a partner in the business; 

For the sake of completeness, we have set out paragraphs 40-42 of the judgment and advisers should bare this in mind when advising clients.

  1. With one exception (the receipt of a share of profits), the above rules are formulated as negative propositions and merely establish the evidential weight to be attached where the particular facts of a case precisely duplicate those set out in the section. However, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to divorce those facts from the surrounding circumstances so as to permit the statutory rules to be applied in their pure form. Fundamentally, in determining the existence of a partnership, regard must be paid to the true contract and intention of the parties as appearing from the whole facts of the case (Lindley & Banks, para 5-03).
  2. There is some further guidance about the evidence required to prove a partnership in Lindley & Banks, Chapter 7 and in particular the types of ‘usual’ evidence relied on in para 7-23 etc including (so far as likely to be relevant here): accounts (draft or final); advertisements; agreements and other documents; bills, circulars and invoices; brochures; conduct; holding out; joint bank accounts; joint property; letters and memoranda; meetings; profit share; tax returns; use of property; wages; and witnesses.
  3. Although conduct is clearly relevant, it will not be determinative, particularly if it can be demonstrated that there was actually no intention to create a partnership. As to witness evidence (which is also relied on) – a witness may be asked whether named individuals compose the firm.

In light of this judgment, it may once again be advisable to go to specialist Counsel for advice especially where the reliefs sought are large, and Counsel can then advise if appropriate upon the collation of evidence. Our suggestion would be to obtain statements of truth from the Clients with exhibits in the form set out as required by the FTT (Elysium law can assist in this respect) and obtain further evidence such as that mentioned above. Above all, read and consider Section 2 (1) and (2) above and once again go through PIM1030 with the clients.

In summary, the reliefs available to people who carry on a property business partnership are significant, but a thorough process must be undertaken with the clients before incorporation takes place.

Points to remember

  • Is there a business and can this be evidenced by facts if required?
  • Is there a Partnership? NOTE: Co-Ownership is not the same. Again, can this be evidenced by the partnership accounts, any partnership agreement, any stationery in the name of the partnership used by the partners for correspondence?
  • If in doubt, get a further opinion from Counsel and ask what evidence is required including statements of truth from the clients.
  • Go through PIM1030 and the Partnership Act.
  • Clarify what the debt/equity position is and get this certified by the clients in clear terms.

Anti-Avoidance Rules

Anti-avoidance rules are set out in the Finance Act 2003 Sch 15 para 17A.

Paragraph 17A imposes a charge to SDLT if, during the three years after a para 10 transfer of land to a partnership, the transferor or a partner connected with the transferor:

(i)         Withdraws money or money’s worth from the partnership (other than income profit);

(ii)        Reduces their interest in the partnership share; or

(iii)      Ceases to be a partner. This would include the withdrawal of capital from the capital account and the repayment of a partner’s loan.

Does incorporation constitute a withdrawal for these purposes?

Some ask whether an incorporation is to be treated as a ‘withdrawal’ for the purposes of para 17A

The answer is no. A withdrawal is only a qualifying event if it is coupled with a partner withdrawing capital from his account, reducing his interest in the partnership

Further Anti-Avoidance provisions

Of further interest is Section 75A of the Finance Act 2003

This may be relevant where the following takes place:

  1. Property investor operates as a sole trader or joint owner with A.N. Other;
  2. A Partnership or LLP is formalised; and
  3. Sometime afterwards this Partnership is ‘converted’ to NewCo

Without any of the anti-avoidance provisions, and assuming this was the genuine substance of the transaction, then an SDLT charge could be avoided.

Clearly, the planning could fall within the generality of s75A given that:

  1. The property Investor (V) will dispose of a chargeable interest and NewCo (P) will acquire it;
  2. Subject to the precise definition of ‘transaction’, a transaction [the partnership and the incorporation] is involved in connection with the disposal and acquisition (“the scheme transactions”); and
  3. 3.      the amounts of stamp duty land tax payable in respect of the scheme transactions would be less than the amount that would be payable on a notional land transaction effecting the acquisition of V’s chargeable interest by P on its disposal by V.

One question, highlighted above, is whether we have a scheme transaction. This is defined at s75A (3) which provides a (non-exhaustive) list of ‘transactions. The incorporation process would not fall within the definitions of a scheme transaction.

A question would therefore be whether, assuming that the Partnership had been in place for a reasonable period, and was being genuinely operated as a partnership, there is a realistic danger that HMRC would invoke 75A?

Whilst I am aware, that HMRC is seeking to apply this section more aggressively than it has historically done so in relation to SDLT planning arrangements, I do not believe that there is a real risk of HMRC making a successful attack. This section needs to be carefully reviewed with the client however before incorporation takes place.

Conclusion

In conclusion property incorporation can be very useful in many circumstances but clearly each and every aspect of it both as to the calculations and principles of the existence of the business and as a separate consideration the partnership must be carefully considered.

If you require further advice on incorporations relief or require assistance, then please call us on 0151 328 1968 or visit our website www.elysium-law.com.


[1] Ramsay v HMRC [2013] UKUT 0236 (UTT).

[2] Partnership includes LLP

[3] See paragraphs 10-12 of Schedule 15

[4] See HMRC guidance at PIM1030 which SHOULD be read and gone through with the client.

Causes of Action in Failed Off-Plan Developments

In this article Ruby Keeler-Williams of Elysium Law considers actions in relation to failed fractional off-plan developments. The article takes a look at the courses of action together with the potential heads of loss.

During the past 5 years we have had the privilege of representing a number of large, multi-national groups in claims for professional negligence, breach of trust and breach of contract against conveyancing solicitors relating to various off-plan fractional residential development schemes.

The Facts

These cases have inevitable followed a similar formula, in that a Developer markets and sells an off-plan project, predominantly to overseas buyers. These buyers intend to let the units upon completion. The development use a fractional sales model and buyers typically pay large deposits of 50%-80% of the total purchase price. These deposits were due to be used to fund completion of the project and were held on trust within a ‘buyer company’, usually with the Sellers solicitor as director, pursuant to a legal charge.

The money held within the buyer company was all spent on construction and more pertinently marketing and the buyers lost all of their deposits with little to no building work completed.

The Potential Defendants

There were 3 potential defendants to consider in these matters: the Developer, the Seller’s Solicitor and the Buyer’s Solicitor.

The Developer in these cases inevitably went into administration, with the freehold of the development site as the only asset. The buyers were creditors, however the typical recovery tended to be between 10 to 20 pence in the pound of their loss.

Action against the Seller’s solicitor was contemplated, but ultimately not pursued. This was because the funds were being held by the buyer company in accordance with the Agreements for Sale, upon which the Buyer’s Solicitor had been instructed to advise. Further, the release of funds was in accordance with the authority given by the Buyer’s Solicitor. This matter was contemplated in detail in the case Various North Point Pall Mall Purchasers v 174 Law Solicitors Ltd [2022] EWHC 4 (Ch)

This left the Buyer’s Solicitor as the relevant party to pursue in obtaining recourse. The Buyer’s Solicitors were often on a ‘panel’ of solicitors presented by the developer and/or the sales agent. The buyers, who were almost all based overseas, typically received a ‘legal report’, which was brief in it’s explanation and was not expanded upon in meetings with the clients. The clients invariably did not understand that the transaction they were entering into was not a standard conveyance.

Causes of Action

There were 3 grounds pursued in the claims against the Buyer’s Solicitors. These were:

  • Professional Negligence in failing to conduct due diligence into the contracts and other documentation which were contained in the ‘Seller’s pack’ (such as the Agreement for Sale, the Lease, the Management Agreement);
  • Breach of Contract, in failing to properly advise their client and failing to properly carry out due diligence under the letter of retainer; and
  • Breach of Fiduciary Duty and/or Trust in allowing the monies to be paid over to an unregulated ‘buyer company’ account.

The Legal Issues

During the course of these matters, various legal authorities were considered. These included (but were not limited to):

  • Barker v Baxendale Walker Solicitors and another [2017] EWCA Civ 2056 in considering the solicitors specific duty to warn as to the risks inherent in the purchase;
  • BPE v Hughes Holland [2017] UKSC 21 in relation to the approach to assessing damages for loss of chance in a professional negligence claim;
  • SAAMCO in considering whether the solicitors were retained to provide information or advice;
  • Dreamvar (UK) Limited v Mischcon de Reya; P&P Property Ltd v Owen White & Catlin LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 1082 in considering the buyers entitlement to equitable compensation.

Conclusion

Elysium Law has been successful in obtaining many multi-million pound recoveries for client groups based across the globe in this area of law.

If you have been involved in a failed development similar to this, please call us on 0151 328 1968 or contact us via clerks@elysium-law.com to see if we can assist you.

Data Breach: What Are My Rights

In this article, Ruby Keeler-Williams of Elysium Law considers the consequences of a personal data breach and what rights you have. The article briefly looks at the legislation and considers quantum and case law.

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018 set out rules as to how data is collected, used, stored, and protected.

Under the legislation, any organisation which holds and determines the purpose of the processing of personal data must implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure that the processing of personal data complies with the rules.

A breach of personal data can occur if appropriate measures are not in place. A breach of security may lead to the destruction, loss or unauthorised access to personal data.

This infringes your rights as an individual and can have serious consequences. We have been instructed on matters where a breach in the security of a company led to the unauthorised disclosure of employee identity documents and bank details. These details were then distributed to criminal groups and companies were fraudulently set up in the employees’ names.

If a company that holds your data processes it in breach of the legislation or holds your data in such a way that it is disclosed in an unauthorised way, whether accidentally or deliberately, then you are entitled to claim for compensation.

If your claim is successful, you will receive damages, also known as compensation. You will be able to claim for any identifiable losses which have arisen from fraudulent transactions caused by identity theft. You will also be able to make a claim for general damages if the breach in your data has caused you distress. We will discuss your case at length and identify which damages are relevant to your specific matter.

Your level of compensation will depend on the nature of the data breached. If the data breached does not contain sensitive information (such as name alone) and/or is quickly remedied, then whilst you have a right to claim, in reality the claim will be worth very little and may not be worth pursuing. It is for this reason why you should seek legal advice at the earliest possible opportunity.

Decisions in recent years illustrate that the High Court will not condone claims that are exaggerated and unnecessarily complex. An example is Stadler v Currys Group Ltd [2022] EWHC 160 (QB), whereby a refurbished device was resold without a factory reset to remove the previous users purchase details, leading to a £3.49 purchase being made on the user’s account. The Claimant issued high court proceedings seeking £5,000 in damages for breach of confidence, misuse of private information, negligence and breach of data protection law, seeking injunctive relief. The defendant made an application to strike out the claim and was successful save for the breach of data protection law. The judge also transferred the claim down from the High Court to the County Court and suggested that the small claims court was the appropriate allocation.

In some cases the data breached is sensitive, such as medical records, identity documents, bank details, etc. In these cases, there will be a substantial claim for damages.

Due to the relatively recent developments in technology and the sensitive nature of such claims, there is limited case law detailing the quantum of awards of damages. Many cases settle before they reach the courts. Each case will be assessed on its own merits and due to the individual nature of a claim for distress, a group of individuals who have suffered the same category of data being breached may receive different awards.

Generally, damages for breach of data will be awarded within the following guidelines

  • Personal details (home or email address, date of birth, etc) – £1,000 to £1,500
  • Medical information (depending on who it is disclosed to/the nature of the information) – £2,000 – £5,000
  • Financial information (depending on who it is disclosed to/the nature of the information) £3,000 to £7,500

If you have suffered as a result of a breach of your personal data, please contact us via telephone on 0151 328 1968 or via email at clerks@elysium-law.com to have a discussion with the team. We will have a free, no obligation discussion with you to help determine the merits of your claim and can advise you on the next steps if you wish to pursue it further.

Sole Directors: Amend Your Articles

In this article Richard Gray of Elysium Law considers amendments to the Model Articles adopted by a company with a sole Director.

Elysium Law were approached recently concerning the amendment to the Model Articles adopted by a Company who only had a sole Director.

The Company had secured the offer of a mortgage, but the lender required an amendment to the articles in that the acceptance of the mortgage offer and a charge over the property could be accepted by the Sole Director.

In pursuance of that requirement, we advised upon and amended the articles in the modified form as well as drafting the Special Resolution required.

The decision in Hashmi v Lorimer-Wing [2022] EWHC 191 (Ch) has called into question whether the articles of companies which adopt or automatically incorporate the model articles for private companies must be amended if the company is to be a sole director company. The High Court considered, among other things, the proper interpretation of Model Articles 7 and 11 and held that the provisions in Model Article 11(2) should be construed as imposing a requirement for a company to have a minimum of two directors.

Article 7

“7.—(1) The general rule about decision-making by directors is that any decision of the directors must be either a majority decision at a meeting or a decision taken in accordance with article 8.

(2) If

(a) the company only has one director, and

(b) no provision of the articles requires it to have more than one director,

the general rule does not apply, and the director may take decisions without regard to any of the provisions of the articles relating to directors’ decision-making.

Article 11

11.—(1) At a directors’ meeting, unless a quorum is participating, no proposal is to be voted on, except a proposal to call another meeting.

(2) The quorum for directors’ meetings may be fixed from time to time by a decision of the directors, but it must never be less than two, and unless otherwise fixed it is two.

(3) If the total number of directors for the time being is less than the quorum required, the directors must not take any decision other than a decision

(a) to appoint further directors, or

(b) to call a general meeting so as to enable the shareholders to appoint further directors.”

Article 11, more or less replicates regulation 89, and anticipates that there must be at least two directors to form a quorum. A company as a matter of law however must have only one director.

Where only one director holds office, article 7(2) disapplies any provisions of a company’s articles relating to decision making by directors, provided the articles do not specify that at least two (or more) directors are to hold office at all times. If the articles do specify such a minimum number of directors, a sole director may only take decisions for the purposes of appointing further directors (article 17(1)(b)) or calling a general meeting to allow the shareholders to appoint further directors (article 17(1)(a)).

In Hashmi (above) the Court held that Model Article 7(2) was clear; it permitted a sole director to manage the company, where no provision of the articles required it to have more than one director. In this case, bespoke article 16.1 of the company’s articles replaced Model Article 11(2)) and required there to be multiple directors for board meetings to be quorate which the court considered also to mean that the articles required it to have more than one director. That being the case, Model Article 7(2)(a) was disapplied.

This decision indicates that it would be wise for existing private companies with model articles or articles based upon them may wish to amend them, by for example amending Model Article 11(2) by not requiring the company to have more than one director within the meaning of article 7(2)(a).

It seems that the validity of acts taken by sole directors in companies with articles based on the model articles is now likely to be called into question.

As a consequence, companies which have, or have had, a single director may also wish to consider whether, where appropriate, they should ratify some or all of the previous decisions of those directors. Note that amendments of articles will only take effect from the date of amendment, and not all companies are likely to ratify all past decisions of their sole directors.

Clearly when forming a new company bespoke articles should be filed rather than model articles. The suggestion must be that the provision of Article 11 is changed to accommodate the sole director position. A suggestion has also been made that Article 15; the recording of decisions should also be reviewed to accommodate the position.

Call us on 0151 328 1968 or email clerks@elysium-law.com for an initial discussion with one of our team.